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# EDUCATING THE MEDIA ON OPERATIONAL MATTERS

A Monograph  
By  
Major Philip R. Tilly  
Armor



School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Second Term AY 94-95

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## ABSTRACT

EDUCATING THE MEDIA ON OPERATIONAL MATTERS by  
Major Philip R. Tilly, USA, 118 pages.

The purpose of this monograph was to answer the research question: How can the Army educate the media in operational matters and what benefits might develop from such enhancement?

Three areas provided data for this research: historical examination of the media/military relationship, current Army doctrine addressing the topic, and lastly, contemporary input from members of the media.

The study found that the relationship between the media and the military has its roots in pre-colonial America. This relationship has evolved over time with both beneficial and detrimental consequences. The current relationship enjoyed by both parties is at a peak in many regards. In seeking to educate the media on operational matters, this researcher concluded that the media, for this project, consists of three groups.

A technique to educate each group would include a variation of seminar discussions and pamphlet material. The formal instruction would include historical snapshots of operational warfare; doctrinal recognition of the levels of war; examination of media/military interaction, to include past reporter performance; and operational interview techniques. The pamphlet material would reinforce the seminar material and include more detailed information.

The significance of this study is in recognizing a problematic situation and offering a solution.

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## Section I: Introduction

**One problem the military did not know how to cope with was reporters with too little background.<sup>1</sup>**

The purpose of this study is to answer the research question: How can the Army educate the media in operational matters and what benefits might develop from such enhancement? This topic arose after having spent many hours discussing the relationship between the media and the military in classes here in the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). Within the seminar discussions, the subject of how the media fits into an overall effort to support and achieve national objectives is a common conversation point. The SAMS curriculum explores the works of several writers who have created theories and methods for achieving national objectives.

The Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, described war in terms of a "paradoxical trinity," composed of a balance between the people, the commander and his army, and the government.<sup>2</sup> One assessment made by this author



after having studied Clausewitz during the past few years is that there has to be some kind of link, some glue, that supports this balance. After having examined the relationship between these three elements, this author concluded that information is one of the forces that contributes to this balance. Others also recognize the unique importance information holds in national affairs.

President Clinton concluded his 1994 National Security Strategy document by highlighting the criticality of "mobilizing public support,"<sup>3</sup> in seeking to achieve his objectives of "enhancing our security, promoting prosperity at home, and promoting democracy."<sup>4</sup> He goes further by stating that of all the ingredients found in his strategy, none is more important than his administration's commitment "to explaining our security interests and objectives to the nation . . . ."<sup>5</sup> His desire to "explain" these interests and objectives to the country is predicated on the ability to provide information. This desire, coupled with wanting to mobilize public support, implies that information and the ability to disseminate it is a key element supporting our national strategy.

The monumental importance of information is at a clear pinnacle in national awareness. The current administration continuously underscores the significant role of information technology in carrying our nation to the forefront as we head into the 21st century. Vice President Gore has repeatedly called our attention to the "Information Highway," and how it will keep America in the lead of global competition.

President Clinton identifies politics, economics, and the armed forces as instruments to support his national security strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement."<sup>6</sup> The association between political and economic instruments on the one hand, and information is often much easier to recognize than that between the armed forces and information. People frequently view politics and economics as dependent on dialogue and interaction, whereas military actions are often viewed in terms of hardware and destruction. But information also serves a key role in military activities as well.

Information is the vehicle through which the national strategy is transmitted to the armed forces, and from which the military develops its operational designs for

implementing that strategy. Information is often the process, not just the product, that transmits direction and guidance to our forces. Information, in terms of how the military uses it, is a fluid element, flowing up and down vertically, as well as laterally.

Information that affects the armed forces is not limited to only military matters. Civil unrest, cultural tensions, natural disasters, political instability, national willpower, economic activities, and international conflicts all contribute to the spectrum of situational awareness factors with which the military must contend. These sources of information are often the catalysts that require our nation to respond through one of the "instruments" identified earlier. But what is the channel through which these types of information are made known to the three elements within Clausewitz's trinity?

It is often the media that serves to link the government, the military, and the people, in transmitting information. The media shoulders much of the responsibility for keeping the public informed. The public voices its concerns to the government through elected officials, who in turn have access to activating the military. Often, all

three elements receive information from the media simultaneously. And as reporting becomes more and more "real time" oriented, the advantage of early intelligence and information is lost due to immediate and broad information dissemination.

With the media now postured to provide such fast news coverage about world events, often necessitating prompt responses, the need for precise and reliable information is heightened. In such a climate, the requirement for accurate information is even more critical. This underscores the necessity of having a well-informed, well-versed media capable of reporting on a very broad range of topics. Anyone can film an event, but only a smart reporter can interpret it and explain what is going on in front of the camera. It is that kind of reporting that an audience wants most.

Given the *hunger* for unerring information by the public, military operations pose a particularly challenging task for the media. Suffice to say, that the public is not always satisfied with just seeing the event occur or hearing about the effects, they often want to know why something took place and how it fits into a bigger picture. Because

of this, the media must not only understand the tactical events taking place, but they should appreciate the operational piece that is being pursued. It is around this point that the study will focus.

Not only does the study seek to answer the original research question, but a number of secondary questions have also arisen since starting the project. Some of them include: Is there a problem in the relationship between the media and the military? How can the problem be addressed by both parties? What is the national perception of the media and the military? What is currently being done to familiarize and educate the media and the military about each other? What has had the biggest impact on this relationship in recent years? Is there a difference of approach between a local media source and a national media source when it comes to dealing with the military? If so, why? How are the information requirements different and how can the military address these differences? Lastly, when one says "media," to what is one referring? The reader will find answers to these questions within the study.

Three research methods support this study. First, the fact-finding method<sup>7</sup> serves to establish much of the

"factual" data within the paper. This method produced the historical data, the doctrinal data, material from the National Security Strategy document, and part of the contemporary articles input. A total of five interviews support the study as a form of the survey method of research.<sup>8</sup> The surveys produced the bulk of the contemporary data. Lastly, the critical interpretation method of research<sup>9</sup> allowed this researcher the ability to compile observations and inferences into a solution to the question.

This study seeks to answer the original research question through five steps. It begins with this introduction, followed by an examination of the historical relationship between the media and the military, then a look at current Army doctrine for dealing with the media, then a look at contemporary views on the subject (which includes five interviews with media personnel), and then possible solutions.

## Section II: The Historical Relationship Between the Media and the Military

It is because the military and the news media pursue very different objectives and often hold very different values.<sup>10</sup>

The first essential in military operations is that no information of value shall be given to the enemy. The first essential in newspaper work and broadcasting is wide-open publicity. It is your job and mine to try to reconcile those sometimes diverse considerations.<sup>11</sup>

The relationship between the media and the military is frequently viewed as adversarial. Both parties seek to sustain and protect the American public, but approach the task from different angles. The media wants to inform the public, the military wants to defend it. Rooted in the United States Constitution as essential elements for a free society, both the press and the military have evolved over time to serve the country.

The American press existed before the creation of the United States. Early newspapers reported on the activities of the various elected bodies within the colonies, a process not allowed in Great Britain. The New York General Assembly passed a declaration in 1747 designed to ensure such coverage. The intent being to protect the rights of the colonists to know the activities of their elected representatives.<sup>12</sup> The declaration further stated that to deny or prevent such coverage would violate the "rights and liberties" of the populace.<sup>13</sup> Additionally, the early press shouldered the responsibility for informing the

colonists about the impositions rendered by the British. The press also helped rouse the spirits of those same colonists toward revolution.<sup>14</sup>

This attitude toward freedom of speech and press was included in the Constitution as the 1st Amendment.<sup>15</sup> The early fathers also recognized the need for a militia to ensure the security of the state.<sup>16</sup> The early American press was founded during a time of critical skepticism toward authority, particularly government. This skepticism to *find out* the facts has been a cornerstone of American, as well as British, journalism.

In Great Britain's case, the press arrived on the battlefield in 1854 to cover British activities during the Crimean War. Sir William Howard, for example, reported on the poor execution of the campaign and on the deplorable state of medical treatment for wounded soldiers. Two products resulted from his reporting: improved medical support and the British government's increased involvement with the role of British war correspondents.<sup>17</sup>

During the American Civil War, several Union generals were extremely opposed to journalistic criticism by the press corps. Major General (MG) William T. Sherman, XV



Corps Commander during the Vicksburg campaign, banished reporters from his headquarters.<sup>18</sup> MG Ulysses S. Grant, commanding the Union Army at Vicksburg, allowed reporting of past events, but restricted predictions of future operations.<sup>19</sup> Here in lies the basis of operational security. These different attitudes of Sherman and Grant toward reporters would characterize press and military relations in the future.

World War I reporters often did not report bad news, although they knew about it, due to what was later attributed to their sense of patriotism.<sup>20</sup> Censorship was often imposed upon journalists by the military seeking to protect critical information. World War II was extensively covered by journalists, although they too worked under tight censorship guidelines. Some censorship was self-imposed.

Lieutenant General Patton was visiting wounded soldiers during the Sicily campaign near Nicosia on 11 July, 1943. He encountered a soldier suffering from battle fatigue and slapped the soldier for what he perceived as cowardice. Patton then physically removed him from the hospital ward.<sup>21</sup> On 10 August Patton visited the 93d Evacuation Hospital and found a similar situation with Private Paul G. Bennett.

Patton displayed the same outrage with this soldier.<sup>22</sup>

Four reporters later interviewed Major Charles B. Etter, the admitting officer to the 93d Hospital. This occurred after one nurse who witnessed the second incident reported the story to her boyfriend, a captain working in Public Affairs. Although the reporters decided not to file the story immediately, they did decide to bring it to General Eisenhower's attention. They presented their report on 19 August to Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Bedell Smith, in Algiers. Two days earlier Eisenhower received an official report, through the medical chain of command, highlighting the incident.<sup>23</sup>

Eisenhower, after having directed Patton to apologize for the incident and threatening him with possible relief, approached the reporters on the subject. He told them that he would not impose censorship on the story if they chose to print it. But he "hoped" the reporters would not report it in the interest of retaining Patton. Eisenhower articulated his case that Patton was too valuable for later European requirements. They were instructed to use their own judgment. In his book, Bitter Victory, Carlo D'Este claims the correspondents decided not to publish the story because

of respect felt for Eisenhower and not out of compassion for Patton.<sup>24</sup>

Here is an example of reporters putting the interests of soldiers ahead of the interests of their audience. Which was more important, telling the story and reaping great attention or protecting the general and supporting the cause? These reporters chose the later. Credit must be given to the extraordinary rapport Eisenhower had established with these war correspondents. Had it been another commander, Montgomery for instance, the decision may have been different.

A new element in news reporting arose during this period. Radio reporting and film newsreels began to creep into the forefront of combat coverage. Of the two, film newsreels required the greatest amount of time for development and processing. This marked a shift from print to electronic emphasis.

The Korean War saw a similar focus from journalists, wanting to report the story and help support the cause. Reporters covering these wars often specialized in covering the armed forces. One such reporter covering American forces in Korea was Malcolm W. Browne. He later reported

from Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf. In his book, Muddy Boots and Red Socks, Browne underscores the importance of learning how to cover the military in a combat zone. He points out that reporters in two different categories are at particular risk in a combat zone. The first being those with little to no battle experience, the other are those who have become complacent with danger.<sup>25</sup>

Homer Bigart was another correspondent whose reporting style centered on first hand accounts. Bigart's reputation was based on extensive experience with field soldiers during World War II.<sup>26</sup> He presented a clear tactical picture of the conflict, which was what Americans wanted. In Forward Positions: The War Correspondence of Homer Bigart, the editor states there is a limit on how much of the big picture one reporter can assess.<sup>27</sup> This style of snapshot reporting became the norm for war correspondents. Seldom did they analyze the big picture of how their captured moment contributed to a larger piece. Much of this changed during the Vietnam War.

Television replaced radio and film as a major source of reporting. As will be noted later, television frequently depends upon the picture to tell the story with less

emphasis on commentary. Is this instance, the medium becomes the message.

The Americans and Vietnamese often viewed reporters with deep suspicion.<sup>28</sup> The relationship between the media and the military turned very sour during the Vietnam War. Relations between the press and the executive branch of government were strained following the Cuban missile crisis.<sup>29</sup> As the war drew on into the late '60s, reporters increasingly questioned the information being provided to them by the armed forces.

One point of contention was the body count number reported daily to the press during Saigon news briefs. Some reporters questioned the accuracy of these numbers and headed north into the combat zone to verify these results. What they found was a large inconsistency between what was happening in the field and what was being briefed to them back in Saigon. This was one factor contributing to an ever-growing credibility gap between the media and the armed forces.<sup>30</sup>

Just when this credibility gap was expanding, the North Vietnamese launched a spring offensive that coincided with the coming of their New Year, Tet. Until this point,

American journalists had portrayed the Vietnam war as a success. By and large, press releases out of Saigon carried a favorable picture of tactical successes from the field. Tet changed that perception within the American public.

The Tet Offensive graphically illustrated to Americans, via television, that the North Vietnamese could launch a massive, well-coordinated ground campaign. With film coverage showing how Viet Cong forces had actually penetrated the United States Embassy grounds in Saigon, the American public grew very skeptical. They began to question the accuracy of the information they had been receiving. Had we really been winning up to this point, and if so, how could the north accomplish this?<sup>31</sup> More importantly, especially to the North Vietnamese, Americans began to question the rationale of our involvement in the war. It was a major shift not only in the war, but in American support.<sup>32</sup>

The media, particularly television, shifted its reliance from official press releases to reporting on firsthand accounts of events. The Tet Offensive coverage depicted the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong as a viable enemy pitted against American and South Vietnamese forces.

Unfortunately, that coverage also portrayed a communist victory.

Tom McClanahan, an editorial writer for the Kansas City Star and former Vietnam Marine, maintains that many reporters misinterpreted Tet. They associated this surprise offensive as a psychological victory for the north.<sup>33</sup> He further points out, however, that they missed the big picture.<sup>34</sup> Tactically, the Tet Offensive was a major defeat for the north. Strategically, however, Tet turned the opinions and trust of many Americans and policy makers.<sup>35</sup>

Tet showed that the government and the military had tried to characterize the war in one light, when actually, the situation was somewhat different. It was different in terms of enemy capabilities and allied accomplishments. The media helped produce that image. The credibility gap between the media and the military grew considerably during and after Tet. What was once reported as an American victory in the making was now being questioned. This questioning was articulated by the noted correspondent Walter Cronkite. He concluded that the best we could hope for was a "stalemate," and that negotiations were our only way out.<sup>36</sup>

Another result coming out of the Vietnam War was American reliance upon television to *tell it like it is*. Pictures are hard to argue with, only the accompanying commentary to those pictures might be debated. Tet provided an opportunity for television to capture the public's attention with striking images from the battle ground. Television relies upon the strength of visual images to convey the bulk of the story. With wide battle field access and uncensored graphic images, Vietnam came to serve as the standard for future war-reporting.

Vietnam would also serve for quite sometime as the foundation piece for military attitudes toward the media. The armed forces viewed the media as having shifted sides. No longer did the reporters carry the sterile messages back to home that we were winning the war against an ill-prepared, ill-equipped enemy. Instead, the media showed just how capable an enemy we were fighting, and occasionally showed that we were not always winning.

Some later argued that we lost the war in Vietnam not on that battlefield, but in the homes of America, in front of the television.<sup>37</sup> Many members of the armed forces carried this perception with them from Vietnam, permanently



coloring their attitude toward the media.<sup>38</sup>

By the time American forces deployed to Grenada in 1983 during Operation Urgent Fury, the relationship between the media and the military had greatly deteriorated. The press was deeply suspicious of any governmental authority, particularly the military. The armed forces had grown to distrust the media. Part of the problem came from a perception that the media were out to discredit the military any way they could.

From the media's perspective, they often viewed official military spokespersons as having something to hide or lie about. Referencing stories based on *informed sources* and *anonymous senior military officials* for many articles originating from the Pentagon, the press was increasingly seen as the enemy.<sup>39</sup> Even the Secretary of State under President Reagan voiced concern that the media were "against us."<sup>40</sup>

Because of this tense atmosphere, the press was excluded from covering the initial invasion, and also the first two days of the Grenada operation. This caused serious damage to the already weak media-military relationship. The military stood on operational security

issues for not allowing the press, while the media claimed the First Amendment was being violated. Both sides pointed an ugly finger at the other. What did come out of this confrontation, however, was both parties agreeing to come to a discussion table to iron out differences.<sup>41</sup>

Two panels convened after the operation to examine the requirements and issues that both sides sponsored. The Sidle Commission and the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Military and the Media reviewed both parties' arguments. Both panels concluded that the press has a right to access of military operations, consistent with operational security. Additionally, both agreed press pools should provide initial coverage until more reporters can receive access.<sup>42</sup>

The pool system would serve as the template for further military operations involving the press. During Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm over 2500 correspondents arrived in Saudi Arabia to cover the operation.<sup>43</sup> A larger number than had ever before covered a military operation. The armed forces faced the challenge of how to adhere to the earlier panel recommendations and still accommodate the huge influx.

A Joint Information Bureau (JIB) was set up to handle this large number and ensure uniform dissemination of information. Press Pools served to coordinate reporters going to the field while the JIB handled official releases from Central Army Command Headquarters (CENTCOM). Unlike Vietnam, however, all the stories were subject to security review prior to publishing.<sup>44</sup> A monumental task to say the least, but not overwhelming.

The reports coming out of the Gulf War received great praise for the most part. Viewers and audiences in America gave the media, particularly television, high marks for their overall effort.<sup>45</sup> There was some question, however, about the capabilities of some reporters and their qualifications to cover stories.<sup>46</sup> Reporters frequently drew sharp criticism, even among their own ranks, for lack of familiarity and expertise of military topics.<sup>47</sup>

This lack of familiarity was partially due to reporters wanting to catch the emotional tempo of the war, while disregarding the operational elements.<sup>48</sup> Another explanation could be that most of those reporters never served in the armed forces, in contrast to those of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam.<sup>49</sup> Whatever the reason, many

reporters came to the Persian Gulf lacking a strong comprehension and background for dealing with the armed forces.

Many of these reporters and their news agencies complained about the military's control of news processing and releasing procedures.<sup>50</sup> Because of this, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Pete Williams met after the war with several news media representatives to develop guidelines for future press coverage. Out of this meeting came nine guideline points. These nine points are found in Appendix A. Significant among these points is the first guideline stating that: "Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations."<sup>51</sup> This is a slight departure from the press pool template discussed earlier. The guidelines do not do away with pools altogether, but allow greater flexibility for independent journalistic coverage. This puts greater reliance for military expertise on the part of the individual correspondent.

The military also recognized the need for some changes in how it deals with the press. Everything from Public Affairs operations, to escort officers, to briefing

preparation came under close examination after the Gulf War. Many changes followed, some of which included a change in the doctrine for working with the media. The next section will focus on Army doctrine for dealing with the media.

### Section III: Current Army Doctrine

**They (the American people) demand timely and accurate information on the conduct of military operations.<sup>52</sup>**

Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, is the embodiment of Army doctrine. Changes within this manual have reflected shifts in national security issues, strategy, and operational capabilities. The 1986 edition did not address relations with the media,<sup>53</sup> although the Army was concerned about this issue.

The Army's strategy for dealing with the media, and subsequently the public, centered on three mechanisms: command information, public information, and community relations.<sup>54</sup> The goal of this public affairs approach was to produce motivated soldiers and American public support, while deterring possible opponents.<sup>55</sup> The foundations of this conviction rest on accurate and truthful communication. Of the three elements, public information is the primary element on which this paper focuses.

In 1989 the Army published a regulation detailing its policies toward working with the news media. Regulation (AR) 360-5, Public Information, states that the Army will provide unclassified information to the public regarding its activities.<sup>56</sup> Additionally, it restricts release of information that would adversely affect national security or threaten the privacy or personal security of personnel.<sup>57</sup>

The regulation also addresses the release of unfavorable information, partially a result of lessons learned from Vietnam.<sup>58</sup> In a departure from the Vietnam and Grenada experiences, the regulation directs Army personnel to process and release unfavorable information as expeditiously as favorable information. It underscores the importance of accuracy in public releases and emphasizes attention to possible disinformation.<sup>59</sup>

Three key points are worth noting in this regulation. The first is a stern restriction against any kind of propaganda.<sup>60</sup> The second point forbids withholding information that might generate criticism or embarrassment to the government.<sup>61</sup> In what might be considered a reversal from the Vietnam era, this tactic seeks to ensure maximum disclosure of information. The old adage that honesty is

the best policy is interwoven within this framework.

The third point concerns reporter accreditation. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs establishes criteria for accreditation of news media personnel in covering combat operations.<sup>62</sup> This point recognizes support for the media, while retaining some control of news collection. News agencies select reporters for this certification process. From these recommendations and subsequent accreditations reporter pools are drawn.

This process secures an agreement between the military and the correspondent. The correspondent agrees to follow ground rules established by the command in exchange for command provided assistance. This assistance comes as information, transportation and access to soldiers, and other privileges. These reporters receive treatment similar to that provided a junior field grade officer.<sup>63</sup>

The current FM 100-5, Operations, dated 1993, recognizes that cooperation with the press enhances operations and strengthens public support.<sup>64</sup> The current doctrinal manual for public affairs, FM 46-1 Public Affairs Operations, acknowledges the news media as a critical link between the American public and the Army. This link

provides the public information that increases understanding of the Army and its role in society.<sup>65</sup> From this understanding comes public support; support based not on inflated figures or disinformation, but factual, timely information. The manual concludes by saying that operational security, honesty, exactness, and "timeliness are the underpinnings of the military's relationship with the civilian news media."<sup>66</sup>

The Army's approach toward working with the media has evolved and matured since Vietnam. Current Army doctrine acknowledges the vital contributions the media makes in generating public support for operations. The "we - they" perspective has been replaced by a more team-oriented posture. This formula seeks to serve both parties' interests while still conceding the need for operational security. Thus one can see the Army's doctrinal approach, but what about the media? How does the media approach this relationship and how, based on their assessment, would they attempt to address the original research question?

#### Section IV: Contemporary Input

In seeking to gather contemporary information from



media representatives, five people currently working in or with the news industry were interviewed.<sup>67</sup> Their comments and observations comprise the bulk of this section. Appendix B contains the interview questions. The transcribed notes from the interviews are at Appendices C - G. Those interviewed range in age and experience from a recent college graduate to a businessman who worked in the news media before Vietnam. They include a newspaper editorial staff writer, a female television news anchorperson, a television news assignment editor, a radio commentator, and a college-level advanced broadcast journalism teacher.

This section presents their remarks following the interview question sequence. Their responses are presented either individually or collectively. Endnotes are used only when individual comments are cited. The interviews did not always follow the questionnaire structure. Sometimes, the respondent did not address the question or this author may have chosen to exclude their answer. Each respondent allowed taped recordings of the interviews and direct quotations within this paper. The interviews began with an introduction to the research question, a review of the three

levels of warfare, and a background review of the monograph process.

The first question sought to determine the individual's working experience in dealing with the military. The responses revealed great differences among the group. The background base ranged from Vietnam combat experience, through a West Point education, to very limited direct contact with the military. Those interviewed were predominantly from Kansas City.

The next question asked how they perceived the relationship between the media and military, and how important they thought it was? Collectively they felt that the relationship is very important, particularly in ensuring accurate information flow. Trust was mentioned in more than one interview. At the local and national level they felt it was an overall good relationship, recognizing that some tension might exist.

One respondent noted that the relationship is good now because "the military is perceived as much more competent and has a lot more credibility."<sup>68</sup> He continued to say that the military was prepared for the Gulf War not only in hardware but also "intellectually." This he attributed to

the soundness of our doctrine.<sup>69</sup>

In further addressing this relationship, one person said:

I have no qualms about the military needing to guard secrets, it's part of the business, everybody does. The only difference is that with the military it's life or death national security.<sup>70</sup>

This positive viewpoint was generally shared within the group. The respondents all recognized the need for some information to be guarded, and therefore not released, due to operational security. One respondent attributed this to mid-America values. He felt this same attitude might not be found throughout other parts of the country.<sup>71</sup>

The next question asked about familiarity with the three levels of warfare: strategic, operational, and tactical. Additionally, it asked if the ability to distinguish between the three levels was important for a reporter as well as an audience member. Two of the five recognized the various levels, the other three quickly understood the differences after some explanation.<sup>72</sup>

In addressing the later part of the question, one answered that television is dependent upon visual messages. She also noted that the tactical level is much easier to

present on screen than the operational level. She pointed out that if one could tie an operational deployment to a local soldier going off to war, it might have some appeal. She stated that you must present information in simple terms and appeal to the average citizen's education level.<sup>73</sup>

In another interview the comments focussed on the need for understanding (of the three levels) in order to inform, but not necessarily to predict.<sup>74</sup> Some members of the group remarked that predictive journalism moves beyond the informative process and assumes greater risk. The electronic media members felt that no urgent need existed for reporters to know the different levels.

Interestingly, the editorial writer felt that a reporter's ability to distinguish the three levels is important and "helpful."<sup>75</sup> This acknowledgement underscores the often national and international focus of a newspaper compared to the more local orientation of television.

Both mediums cover local and national issues, but the visual television message supports tactical coverage more than the operational. All responded that most audience members, regardless of medium, would not be that interested in discerning the differences. In those instances where

greater explanation is necessary to better inform the audience, two sources referenced reliance on "military experts" to cover that detail. These experts often come from the local area and are frequently retired military.<sup>76</sup>

The next question asked how reporters prepared to cover military stories. In the newspapers reporters often pass their "source list" to their successors. This source list contains names, phone numbers, and addresses of contacts for seeking specific information. It can serve as a continuity tool. Other than that, preparation for dealing with the military is usually handled through *on the job training*.<sup>77</sup>

One respondent contended that since the draft ended, the historical familiarity gained from prior military experience had ceased. He also pointed out that this lack of military knowledge was quite evident during the Gulf War news briefings when reporters sometimes asked off-base questions.<sup>78</sup> This lack of knowledge and understanding of the military was echoed by several other sources.<sup>79</sup>

The prevalent method for preparing a reporter to cover a military story is to throw the reporter into the setting and let them sort it out. This was attributed to the infrequency of *hot* military stories. This contrasts with

commonly occurring stories such as city hall activities, elections, and criminal/police stories. Because of the routine nature of these stories, reporters are more likely to receive formal instruction on these topics. Also, reporters are more likely to encounter this kind of conventional information in their work environment.<sup>80</sup>

When asked if reporters would benefit from formal education or instruction on operational warfare, the consensus was yes. The idea of absenting a reporter from work, however, received little endorsement. Collectively they said that a news medium could not afford to lose a reporter for such a purpose. The general opinion being that the knowledge gained would not offset the productivity lost during that period. Many suggestions were offered to replace the formal instruction idea and still provide information. Those ideas follow later.

The idea of directing the effort toward the tactical level received more support. Most reporters associate with the tactical level. Additionally, audiences are more familiar with that level and the appeal of visual coverage is more universal. Lastly, the tactical level is much more inviting for people to follow the "Johnny and Jimmy" stories

of local people going off to war.<sup>81</sup>

When asked if their audiences would respond favorably to operational-level information most said yes. The television stations even went as far as to search for so-called "military experts" to provide more in-depth analysis during the Gulf War.<sup>82</sup> The newspapers did the same.<sup>83</sup> But all agreed that most audiences focused at the tactical level.

The next question asked how they would structure a class, seminar, or information handout to address the operational level of war for media personnel. One suggested an open discussion beginning with a condensed review of our current doctrine. Then follow this review with a campaign study to examine how minor considerations can turn a battle or campaign.<sup>84</sup> This method would also accentuate how different levels of warfare overlap.

Another answered by again suggesting the use of historical study to investigate the development of operational warfare. He offered the idea of simulating interviews with real Army officers to familiarize future reporters with tactical and operational-level subjects. This type of interface would also acquaint reporters with

what types of information are typically considered off-limits for interviews.<sup>85</sup>

Yet another commented that a user-friendly guide of common military terms, organization diagrams, equipment, and pictures would greatly assist the media. The emphasis being on basic information that can be used during a fifteen-second film clip. On the reverse side, she emphasized the need for news-smart public affairs soldiers who understand the media and their need for quick, precise information.<sup>86</sup>

The idea of a pamphlet, similar to the Desert Shield/Desert Storm pamphlets on desert warfare, was suggested. The intent being to provide simple to understand information that the average reporter and American can digest. The pamphlet could be updated as equipment or organizations changed. It could also be handed down from one reporter to the next to provide continuity.<sup>87</sup>

Lastly, the idea of Department of Defense sponsored seminars designed to provide a quick *dump* of operational information to regional media personnel came forward. He proposed that reporters attend these sessions once the shooting started. The purpose being to acquire a short, current update on not only the operational level but also



tactical and strategic warfare. Ironically, he felt that contemporary college broadcast curriculums could not support incorporating military-unique instruction due to time constraints.<sup>88</sup>

This contrasts with the findings of an earlier interview. Previously, a respondent said that once a reporter started reporting stories there was no longer time for *formal sit-down* education.<sup>89</sup>

The last question posed asked what benefits would develop from enhancing reporters' knowledge of operational warfare? The general opinion was that from this improved understanding of operational warfare, reporters would be better prepared to cover stories. This improvement would be evident by the quality of questions they asked and the stories they presented.<sup>90</sup> Additionally, reporters would have a finer comprehension of the overall military operation. This comprehension would afford them greater appreciation of how other factors affect the conduct of the operation. This might enable them to anticipate news-worthy stories before they occur and position themselves accordingly.

On the reverse side of this beneficial knowledge is the

ever-present possibility of reporters being reassigned to new subject areas and the enhanced awareness being lost. This is particularly likely in a news organization that lacks depth in reporters. While the benefits of a *smarter* reporter are acknowledged, those benefits may be transitory as reporters are seldom allowed to specialize on military topics.<sup>91</sup>

After considering all these factors, how might one solve the original research question: How can the Army educate the media in operational matters and what benefits might develop from such enhancement?

#### Section V: Conclusions and Solutions

The most enlightening portion of this research process has been the openness and receptiveness of the media personnel toward the research topic and the military at large. Admitting an initial degree of prejudice toward the media, this researcher found himself greatly mistaken by preconceived ideas.

The media members who supported this project displayed a genuine interest in the topic, the intent behind the effort, and the potential benefits that might develop. Not

only did they actively participate during the interviews, but their suggestions and recollections often led to more information sources and references. The solution offered in this last section came largely from the interviews. There are a few points to establish first.

Mr. McClanahan pointed out during his interview that an assumption had been made regarding the research question. That assumption being that media personnel targeted for this "education" would want to participate and receive this knowledge. This begs the question: Is there really a problem here that needs to be addressed? The answer is yes.

There was considerable complaint after DS/DS that the military imposed too much control on the media. Part of the reason for this control was limited logistical capability to support all the reporters, but there were other reasons as well. One author noted that the media failed to adequately cover the Gulf War due to ill-prepared reporters.<sup>92</sup>

Another noted that individual reporters did not always display the competence worthy of trust by American viewers, and frequently operated more productively in numbers.<sup>93</sup> One final source points out that combat is no time for on-the-job training for reporters. The concluding point being:

In lieu of a full-time war to cover, the media need to devote the time and effort to training competent military correspondents.<sup>94</sup>

Based on these observations and the historical track record between the media and the military, the need exists for the media to receive this type of education.

Several considerations affected the solution to the research question. One factor is the audience to whom the media seeks to appeal. If the information consumers are local, with primarily local interests, the coverage then will most likely have a local approach. Consequently, this type of education may not appeal or apply to all media.

If, however, the coverage is to a broader market, possibly at the national level, there may be some merit to providing operational information. The larger news organizations are more likely to have the resources and reporters to devote to operational education. Their focus is at a broader level of coverage and therefore would most likely support operational information.

In the original research question, the "media" is composed of the men and women who make up the various news mediums. The original "media" target is considered to have three components. The first is reporter wanna-be's;

students in college studying journalism or broadcasting. Reporters who have gained some working experience, but are not very senior, make up the second group. Also in this second group would be junior editors, section heads, and college journalism instructors.

The last group comprises senior reporters, assignment editors, and editorial staff writers. This group represents a more experienced body of media personnel who may have a greater history of covering military affairs.

This distinction is made among the three levels because the knowledge level, the experience base, and the open-mindedness toward the military are different within each group. Due to this consideration, the technique for applying this educational process would differ in each case.

In all three cases, a potential solution for educating media personnel on operational matters would include a combination of seminar-type discussions and instruction, coupled with user-friendly ready-reference pamphlets. The application of this process would depend upon available time, number of personnel to attend, and the receptiveness of the intended audience.

The goal of this instruction has four segments. The

first being to develop an appreciation for the historical framework from which operational warfare developed. The second part being an examination of the doctrinal approach toward warfighting and dealing with the media. The third objective would be to develop a comprehension of contemporary operational warfare. And the last element would be a hands-on approach to working at the operational level.

The process would start with a brief review of a military campaign. A Napoleonic case study would likely intrigue the audience and highlight some operational terminology. Next would be a condensed review of current Army doctrine, with an emphasis on the three levels of warfare and how they overlap. This review would examine the products, the level of organizations, and the people historically associated with each level.

Also included here would be an investigation of how doctrine directs the Army to interface with the media and what parameters apply. This initial block would conclude with a historical vignette on Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (DS/DS) and a short clip of General Schwarzkopf's briefing, to include the closing interview session.

The next block would look at what components of DS/DS made up the three levels of warfare and how reporters covered these areas. Emphasis being on the occasional lack of preparation reporters displayed, and hard lessons learned by the military in handling the media. This later portion would also draw from Vietnam experiences. This portion would compare and contrast national versus local coverage approaches, and also reporter techniques. This portion would close with a review of the current Department of Defense guidelines for working with the media.<sup>95</sup>

Lastly, the group would receive pamphlets that would serve as a quick reference guide to American armed forces. They would include terminology, historical notes on campaigns, basic organization structures, and some points about joint warfare. These last points would address how a Joint Information Board (JIB)<sup>96</sup> works, how the accreditation process operates,<sup>97</sup> and simple explanations of how joint operations support campaign objectives.

The main idea behind this format is to present an abbreviated look at the structure of warfare. It also seeks to illustrate how the armed forces approach each level in terms of planning and operations. Lastly, it attempts to

teach reporters, with the use of documented interviews and articles, how to better understand the big picture to better prepare for event coverage.

If time allowed, the group would conduct mock interviews with military personnel acting as operational level spokespersons. The interviews would focus on testing the reporters general understanding of how operational terminology applies and stress their ability to associate certain tactical level occurrences with operational consequences.

The potential benefits resulting from this educational effort would include better informed reporters. If the reporters are more informed, they will most likely be better prepared to understand the situation and ask more in-depth questions. This enhanced depth of coverage would improve the overall product going to audiences.

Additionally, there might also be less reliance on so-called military experts to do all the analysis. Recognizing that only so much expertise could be established, it would still reduce the dependency on external sources.

Finally, given a better understanding of warfare at the operational level, reporters would have an enhanced



appreciation for the entire spectrum of warfare. If they could not devote themselves solely to the operational level, they would be more effective covering either tactical or strategic activities. Regardless, the American public would receive a higher quality product from the media, and hence be better informed.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>John R. Whiting, "War-Live!" Naval Institute Proceedings Vol 118/8/1,062 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, August 1991), 65. This quotation is taken from an article that reviewed the conditions under which the media and the military interacted during the Gulf War. Several conclusions are generated by the author, this quotation is one of his findings.

<sup>2</sup>Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Gutersloh, Germany: Mohndruck Graphische Betriebe GmbH, 1976), 101.

<sup>3</sup>William Clinton, President, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), 5.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 29.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 29.

<sup>7</sup>Tyrus Hillway, "The Scholar as Detective: The Search for Clues," in Introduction to Research (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), 99 - 101. The fact-finding method of research focuses on searching for facts to provide information concerning the problem.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 187 - 210. The survey method of research seeks to gather data from numerous sources that can contribute in answering the research question. The survey method, or descriptive study, seeks to gather information about an existing situation. In this case, the interviews sought to gather information from media experts. They are called "experts" because they are professional media personnel.

Those people interviewed for the study were recommended to this author by the Public Affairs Office, here at Fort Leavenworth.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 101 - 103. The critical interpretation method of research relies upon logical reasoning to determine solutions. It is applicable when specific facts addressing a problem are lacking. For the historical portion of research compiled for this study, few facts specifically addressing the research question are available. Instead, there are many observations that could apply toward the overall research effort. From these observations one can draw conclusions based on association and reasoning.

<sup>10</sup>Charles W. Ricks, The Military - News Media Relationship - Thinking Forward, (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA: GPO, 1993), v.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 5. This quotation is cited as having originated from a regulation for war correspondents accompanying Allied Expeditionary Forces in World War II, 1994.

<sup>12</sup>Bernard Bailyn and John B. Hench, ed., The Press and the American Revolution, referencing the "Afterword" by James Russell Wiggins (Worcester: American Antiquarian Society, 1980), 366.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 365.

<sup>15</sup>Constitution, Amendment I, as reproduced on "Multimedia Encyclopedia, Version 1.5," CD-ROM, (Novato, CA: Grolier Inc., 1992).

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., Amendment II.

<sup>17</sup>James B. Brown, Captain, "Media Access to the Battlefield," Military Review Vol LXXII no 7 (July 1992), 11.

<sup>18</sup>Earl Schenk Miers, Web of Victory (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1955) 69.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 42.

<sup>20</sup>Winant Sidle, Major General, "The Gulf War Reheats Military-Media Controversy," Military Review Vol LXXI no 9 (September 1991), 53.

<sup>21</sup>Carlo D'Este, Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, 1943 (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1988), 483-484.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., 487.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 488.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>Malcom W. Browne, Muddy Boots and Red Socks (New York: Random House, Inc., 1993), 187.

<sup>26</sup>Betsy Wade, ed., Forward Positions: The War Correspondence of Homer Bigart (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1992).

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., xxi.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 185.

<sup>29</sup>Valerie Adams, The Media and the Falklands Campaign (New York: St. Martins's Press, Inc., 1986), 37.

<sup>30</sup>Alan Hooper, The Military and the Media (Aldershot, England: Gower Publishing Company, Limited, 1982), 112.

<sup>31</sup>Interview with E. Thomas McClanahan, Editorial staff of the Kansas City Star, 21 February 1995, by the author. Sound recording transcribed to print, included as Appendix C to this study.

<sup>32</sup>Daniel C. Hallin, The Uncensored War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 168, as referenced in George Norton's Master's thesis: Impact of Television Reporting on

Military Conflicts, University of Kansas, 1988, page 49.

<sup>33</sup>E. Thomas McClanahan, "Gulf Correspondents have forgotten how media botched Tet '68," Kansas City Star, Editorial page, February 14, 1991.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1982), 95, as referenced in George Norton's thesis (See note #32), 50.

<sup>36</sup>Don Oberdorfer, Tet! (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971), 250 - 251.

<sup>37</sup>Keeyes Beech, "How to Lose a War: A Response from an 'Old Asia Hand,'" in Vietnam Reconsidered, Salisbury, ed., 152, as referenced in George Norton's thesis, 83 - 84.

<sup>38</sup>James B. Brown, 12.

<sup>39</sup>Joseph Metcalf, III, Vice Admiral, "The Mother of the Mother," Naval Institute Proceeding Vol 118/8/1,062 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, August 1991), 56.

<sup>40</sup>James B. Brown, 12.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 12 - 13.

<sup>43</sup>Mike Sherman, Captain, USN, "Informing through the JIB," Naval Institute Proceedings Vol 118/8/1,062 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, August 1991), 59.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., 59 - 60.

<sup>45</sup>James B. Brown, 13 - 14.

<sup>46</sup>Peter Braestrup, "The Performance of the Press," The Media and the Gulf War, Hederick Smith, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Policy Institute of the School of Advanced

International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1992), 234.

<sup>47</sup>John R. Whiting, 66.

<sup>48</sup>Henry Allen, "The Gulf Between the Media and the Military," The Media and the Gulf War, 264.

<sup>49</sup>Interview with Mr. Jerry Fogel, President of Martin Fromm and Associates, Inc., and a radio talk show commentator in Kansas City. Conducted by the author, 23 February 1995, sound recording transcribed to print. Included as Appendix F to this study.

<sup>50</sup>Letter addressed to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, 29 April 1991, from approximately two dozen newspaper, television, and wire service companies voicing displeasure over handling of the media during the Gulf War. This letter is reproduced in The Media and the Gulf War, 378 - 380.

<sup>51</sup>Guidelines for Coverage of DoD Operations," as reprinted in The Military - News Media Relationship: Thinking Forward, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993), 37. This is one of nine points in the guideline.

<sup>52</sup>Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), 1-3.

<sup>53</sup>Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1986).

<sup>54</sup>Department of the Army, FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992), 1-2. Command information is targeted at internal audiences that include soldiers, their families, and civilian employees. Public information is provided to American and foreign publics through the civilian news media. Community relations focuses on direct contact with civilians and community leaders in areas of military operations.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., 1-1.

<sup>56</sup>Department of the Army, Army Regulation 360-5, Army

Public Affairs: Public Information (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 31 May 1989), 3. This regulation's purpose is to prescribe public information objectives, principles, and procedures. It also establishes policies and procedures for review, clearance, and release of information to the public.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., 4. The regulation states that "A free flow of general and military information will be made available, without censorship or propaganda to men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents." Although not specifically defined within the regulation, propaganda is mentioned in FM 46-1 as "attempting to influence public opinion through the use of misinformation, disinformation or deceit." (page 1-5). The manual states that the Army will not indulge in such activities against its citizenry. It does state that "It is not propaganda to present positive information about the U.S. military that serves to provide foreign and domestic publics a true perspective of military roles, capabilities and readiness." (page 1-6).

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., 7.

<sup>63</sup>FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations, 2-35.

<sup>64</sup> FM 100-5, Operations, 1993, 3-7.

<sup>65</sup>FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations, 1-3.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., 2-9.

<sup>67</sup>The author interviewed five people who currently work with or in the news media industry. Mr. E. Thomas McClanahan is an editorial staff writer for the Kansas City Star. He is a former Marine having served in Vietnam. Many of the issues he addresses in the editorial section deal

with national defense. Mr. Mike Lewis is a news Assignment Editor for KDAF television in Kansas City. He has covered some military-oriented stories in Kansas, mostly to do with Fort Riley and National Guard activities. Miss Lisa Rinehart is a co-anchor and news reporter also for KDAF television, having worked there for approximately three years. Like Mr. Lewis, she attended college in Kansas and covered similar military stories. Mr. Jerry Fogel is President of Martin From and Associates, Inc. He has a morning radio talk show on KNHN, AM radio, a CNN affiliate. He attended the United States Military Academy and has been in media for over forty years. He has served in numerous public affairs positions within Army National Guard and Reserve units. Mr. Doug Suddhof is an advanced broadcast journalism teacher at the University of Kansas in Lawrence. He has some experience covering military stories, mostly within Kansas. He has considerable reporting experience for television.

<sup>68</sup>McClanahan Interview, 21 February 1995, sound recording.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid. Mr. McClanahan spoke with Colonel (now retired Brigadier General) Wass de Czage a few years ago. (Please see McCalahan interview notes, Appendix C). During this conversation COL Wass de Czage explained how the Air Land Battle Doctrine had evolved, what its components were, and what direction it was expected to take the Army. He highlighted to Mr. McClanahan the revolutionary changes this new doctrine held and demonstrated to him the idea of depth on the battlefield, using a salt and pepper shaker. COL Wass de Czage is the founding father of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) and helped author Air Land Battle Doctrine.

<sup>70</sup>Lewis interview, 22 February 1995, sound recording.

<sup>71</sup>Fogel interview, 23 February 1995, sound recording.

<sup>72</sup>Mr. McClanahan and Mr. Fogel knew the three levels of warfare. Mr. Lewis, Miss Rinehart, and Mr. Suddhof quickly discerned the levels once the author explained the differences and illustrated the overlapping characteristics.



characteristics.

<sup>73</sup>Rinehart interview, 22 February 1995, sound recording.

<sup>74</sup>Lewis interview.

<sup>75</sup>McClanahan interview.

<sup>76</sup>McClanahan and Rinehart interviews.

<sup>77</sup>McClanahan interview.

<sup>78</sup>Fogel interview.

<sup>79</sup>Peter Braestrup, "Chapter Seven: Washington and Saudi Arabia, How Good was the Press?" The Media and the Gulf War, Hederick Smith, ed., (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Policy Institute of the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1992), 234.

<sup>80</sup>Rinehart and Suddhof interviews.

<sup>81</sup>Fogel interview.

<sup>82</sup>Lewis interview.

<sup>83</sup>McClanahan interview.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.

<sup>85</sup>Lewis interview.

<sup>86</sup>Rinehart interview.

<sup>87</sup>Fogel interview.

<sup>88</sup>Suddhof interview.

<sup>89</sup>Lewis interview.

<sup>90</sup>Fogel interview.

<sup>91</sup>McClanahan interview.

<sup>92</sup>Michael Morgan, Justin Lewis, Sut Jhally, "More Viewing, Less Knowledge," Triumph of the Image: The Media's War in the Persian Gulf - A Global Perspective, Hamid Mowlana, George Gerbner, and Herbert I. Schiller, ed., (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 229.

<sup>93</sup>William V. Kennedy, The Military and the Media: Why the Press Cannot Be Trusted to Cover a War (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 151. It is interesting to note that the dedication page of this text includes the O'Sullivan Rule: "The function of journalism is not to tell the drowning man that the dam has broken, or to warn the community that the dam is cracked and that they should run for the hills. The function of journalism is to warn the community that the dam is in danger of cracking." Predictive journalism?

<sup>94</sup>Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 411.

<sup>95</sup>The Joint Information Board (JIB) was the military organization in Saudi Arabia that helped the media cover the Gulf War. It was responsible for handling all reporters coming into country, linking them up with military forces, distributing information, and assisting in transmitting information back to reporter's home countries. See "Informing through the JIB," by Captain Mike Sherman, USN, in the August 1991 edition of Naval Institute Proceedings, 59.

<sup>96</sup>The accreditation process for reporters to cover military operations is covered under Department of Defense guidelines. Field Manual (FM) 46-1 addresses the process of pages 2-35 to 2-37. Of note is that reporters not accredited may be denied access to units and personnel by the command. "Unaccredited personnel are allowed no more access than that afforded the public."

## APPENDIX A:

### GUIDELINES FOR COVERAGE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OPERATIONS

1. Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.
2. Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. operations. But pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity - within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early-access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists in the area.
3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.
4. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. Forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operation and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.
5. Journalists will be provided access to military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.
6. Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.

7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders will permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.

8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

9. These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DoD National Media Pool System.

[Department of Defense Directive 5122.5, Enclosure 3, May 19, 1992.]

## APPENDIX B:

### INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

I am conducting research as part of our spring curriculum requirement to produce a monograph addressing the operational level of warfare. The study seeks to answer the following:

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RESEARCH QUESTION: How can the Army educate the media in operational matters and what benefits might develop from such enhancement?  
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1. What is your background in media and what experience do you have in dealing with military affairs?
2. How important do you think it is that the media, particularly your medium, and the military have a good, working relationship? Why?
3. How would you characterize this relationship locally and nationally? What do you base that on?
4. What role do you believe media played in developing that relationship?
5. If I described the three levels of warfare (tactical, operational, and strategic), would you feel comfortable with your ability to distinguish between the three? Do you think it is important in your business to have the ability to make that distinction?

6. How do you prepare your reporters before they go out to cover a military story? Formal training, orientation booklet, mentoring, or some other method?
7. Do you think it would be productive for your organization if your reporters received some kind of formal/informal training on operational warfare? Tactical warfare?
8. How would your audience react to stories that addressed, in some detail, the operational framework of future or on-going military operations? Is there a need for that kind of analysis within your radio program(s)?
9. If you could structure an educational program or discussion aimed at enhancing operational understanding of warfare within your medium, what would it include, who should be part of the forum, and what objectives would you establish?
10. What benefits can you see developing from such an effort?

## APPENDIX C:

### McCLANAHAN INTERVIEW

Notes from 21 February, 1995, interview with Mr. E. Thomas McClanahan, editorial board for the Kansas City Star.

Tilly: Describes the intent behind the study and the purpose of the interview. Asks Mc: to describe his journalistic background.

Mr. McClanahan: I've. . . I've had ten years with the wires (wire services, such as UPI), I spent ten years in Cheyenne, Denver, and Dallas and spent a few months in suburban journalism. I came here and in '84 I moved over to the editorial page.

Tilly: Have you done an a lot of dealing with military, military topics?

Mr. McClanahan: I write about defense on the editorial page. I'm a Vietnam veteran.

Tilly: A Vietnam veteran?

Mr. McClanahan: Yea. Marine Corps.

Tilly: As you look at the relationship between the media and the military, do you think that is an important relationship, from your perspective, where you are right now?

Mr. McClanahan: Ah, you mean as far as my day to day job?

Tilly: Yes, sir.

Mr. McClanahan: As an editorial writer I try to deal with

conceptual things, rather than report the news. So I'm not in a position where I'm always calling the pentagon, or trying to work data out of people, I don't read books on the subject, articles, read congressional records, the debate in congress on the defense bill. I have not had to try to develop a relationship with defense people that much on that issue, not so much local stuff.

Tilly: Would you see your focus then, on military matters, more at the national level?

Mr. McClanahan: Oh yea, stuff like, ah, the debate over the strategy. . . the bottom up review.

Tilly: Base closures?

Mr. McClanahan: Yea, I've done a couple of pieces on base closures.

Tilly: How would you characterize the relationship, as you see it, between the media and the military, at the national level?

Mr. McClanahan: Right now it's a, not bad, it's pretty good I think, compared to Vietnam, but because the military is perceived as much more competent and has a lot more credibility.

Tilly: What do you think the role of the media has been in bolstering that perception? Do you think that's had an active part in developing that perception, the media, either directly or indirectly?

Mr. McClanahan: I don't know if it's the media. . . the media is reporting what defense department is doing. . . and there was . . . a low point in the '70s when we had talk of a hollowed out force. Then there was a big buildup in the '80s and then we learned in the Gulf War that a lot of the "stuff" (was pretty good) although not to the extent we were told during the actual combat. Still, when everybody saw the pictures of the bombs going in those doors. And that didn't always happen, but the fact that that could happen, to a significant extent. Stuff like that, images like that,



and . . the speed with which the ground war was concluded. .  
. gave the defense department a lot of credibility.

COL Wass de Czage told me one thing, about a story I was writing. I did a piece on the development of Airland Battle, the doctrine, he said that no army ever gets its doctrine right before a war. I think the Gulf War is the exception. They were prepared not only in terms of hardware, but also intellectually.

Tilly: Do you think that the average American, and that's kinda' hard to define, but do you think the average American would share that perspective?

Mr. McClanahan: That what?

Tilly: That we had it right going into that fight?

Mr. McClanahan: The doctrine?

Tilly: Ah-huh.

Mr. McClanahan: The average American doesn't care. They care about results. [TARGET: herein is the true measure of effectiveness, in its truest, most applicable terms. But how are those results documented to the American public? Hence, the significant role of the media - Tilly's thoughts.] They don't want to get into sub-paragraphs. That's why we have the division of labor. Something, something else for someone to do. (unable to understand the next line).

Tilly: That gets into one of my next questions. That me ask you, sir, you obviously have a military background, you seem well versed in military affairs. If I said tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare, are you comfortable with your ability to discern the difference

Mr. McClanahan: Yea, yea I think so. . .

Tilly: . . . between those three levels of warfare.

Mr. McClanahan: Strategic would be prepare, how you prepare

to fight wars, your strategy, how you fight them to win.  
And the next. . .

Tilly: Operational.

Mr. McClanahan: Right, that would be. . . corps level. . .

Tilly: Usually associated with that level of unit or above. Often tactical being more down in the dirt, people shooting rifles, a lot of direct action kind of stuff.

Mr. McClanahan: Do you still have fire teams?

Tilly: Yes, sir. We have changed the idea of the Infantry squad from the time when you were in the marines. It's gone from a twelve-man, down to a nine-man team. They've changed some of the weapons and now have them riding in Bradley Fighting Vehicles. They don't carry as many people, and a lot of people think they're too large. On the reverse side of that it has improved protection, and much better fire power. And it has the ability to stay up with the M1 tank.

Tilly: How do you, here in the Kansas City Star, prepare a reporter before they go out to cover a military activity, or military operation? Is there a orientation book, or a formal process that orients them to the military, something that prepares them for some of the phrases or new words that they might here, or do you just point them in the right direction and say 'Go forth and learn, and do well?'

Mr. McClanahan: It's the latter. In journalism it's always been like that. If one reporter leaves and another takes over he'll say 'here's my source list.' And the second reporter will probably pay no attention to that whatsoever.

Tilly: You're able to distinguish between those three levels of warfare, do you think it is important for your reporters, as they go out to cover different military affairs, to have the same ability to make that distinction?

Mr. McClanahan: It would be helpful, yes.

Tilly: Do you think it would be productive or beneficial

for your reporters to receive some type of formal or informal kind of instruction that might acquaint them with those different levels of warfare prior to their going out and covering a story or operation, such as shipping overseas with the 1st ID (Infantry Division). Do you think it would be beneficial for them to receive some kind of training or participate in some kind of dialogue that would familiarize them with those different kinds of warfare?

Mr. McClanahan: Yea, ah sure, I mean, it wouldn't hurt. When they go out to do work like that. . . their sense of where the story lies won't necessarily cohere to those categories. So they might not be thinking about that.

Tilly: Part of what I've been struggling with during this study is how we, in the military, can do a better job of working with the media in telling our story, recognizing that sometimes there are bad stories as well as good stories. One of the things I've been playing with to address this "semi-problem" is to bring reporters up to a certain level, a certain degree of familiarity with what we do, how we talk, the unique words we use in the military for operations, maybe a smattering of doctrine, so that when they see something happening on the battlefield, they understand that is part of a bigger picture. And that bigger picture is sorta' that operational-level of warfare. Do you think, sir, that people in your audience would be interested in articles that got into the operational framework of military operations in terms of things like centers of gravity (we then briefly discussed centers of gravity), culminating points (another brief discussion), and we talk in those kinds of terms. Do you think your audience would be interested in getting that kind of analysis?

Mr. McClanahan: By itself? No. There has to be a hook.

Tilly: What do you mean by a hook?

Mr. McClanahan: Something new. I mean . . . ah, let me turn it around and ask you this. Would you be interested in reading a story about how, ah, the local government purchases paperclips? If they had changed how they did it, if they suddenly privatized how they did this, then that

would be an entry point and would offer this. An example (for your case) would be when they changed the doctrine in the early '80s. This gave me a way to discuss all these other things. What was learned from Vietnam, the Harry Summer's book about strategy. But to offer all this other stuff, you just can't sell it to editors, because there is so much competition, so much other stuff. What you're talking about is just a manner.

Tilly: Well, what I'm thinking about, well let me describe a scenario to you based in the middle east, and we find ourselves involved in another large, military operation. Forces are at combat with each other, and you have a reporter who is dispatched to that area to cover the story. Would your reporter have the ability to analyze what the 1st ID might be doing as part of the bigger picture, what they were doing and contributing. . .

Mr. McClanahan: Now that would be interesting because that would have predictive value. This is what made the stories during the Gulf War, so compelling. People could not get enough of it. Not only in TV but in papers. So you would sit down because you wanted to figure out what was going on. Everybody had, including the papers, their so-called 'military experts' who knew what Saddam's strategy might be, who knew how our people might think, and who, based on my knowledge, thought here's what might unfold. And if you were in the situation, and lives were at stake, that would be the perfect vehicle to unload, to gain that background knowledge from. But from your point of view there's a problem there.

Tilly: Very much so, because there is also the element of operational security [Paradox between the doctrinal guidance of maximum disclosure in minimum amount of time (FM 43-100), balanced with security of operations, soldier's lives, and achieving success on the battlefield. Tilly's notes.]

which smacks right up against this very idea.

Mr. McClanahan: That's right, because sometimes you folks wouldn't want that.

Tilly: That's correct. One of the things I've studied is our doctrine in terms of how public affairs go. One of the tenets of public affairs says that we'll have 'Maximum disclosure in minimum time.' You want to give as much information in the shortest amount of time possible.

Mr. McClanahan: That's subjective.

Tilly: But that's also tempered by that need for operational security which might require that I can tell you so much, but I can't tell you any more than that. What I'm thinking of is a reporter coming into a situation, and possibly a savvy reporter who's been out there, knows what he's doing, and may have studied or covered military operations before, and has a feel for it. They have a way, possibly even a predictive way, of recognizing that some events preclude others, and some events typical follow others. So that, for instance at the tactical level, they know that before you send your forces into the obstacle to do the breach, you prep the enemy positions with artillery fire. If they are able to develop that same kind of familiarity one notch up, at the operational level, to recognize that we have isolated the enemy's reserve, they've been cut off logistically, and now the air force is punishing them from the sky, well, that's where we are in this phase of the operation. Well, that reporter might then recognize that the next likely or possible phase or the ground campaign plan would be to then attack them with ground forces. That reporter would know to look for that. Without giving away operational security, they could be saying in their article, the air campaign seems to have isolated the enemy's reserve, it is highly likely that we might soon expect to see, based on doctrine and what history has shown that works, a ground campaign may be kicking off soon. And if I understand you, you're saying your audience would like to hear what they may be seeing next, how might this whole thing develop. I'm thinking, if it comes from a smart reporter, who is familiar with those kinds of ideas and concepts, I can see a lot of good things coming from that. It could bolster your readership interest and circulation, and from the military side, it could tell the story in a smart way, without a lot misguided speculation. There's always going to be some speculation, but based on a

good idea and on his familiarity on how the Army does there business, next, we might expect to see the following things occur.

It lends itself to the next question. If you were going to set up or structure a course or dialogue to discuss these things, and you wanted to familiarize them, how would you go about it?

Mr. McClanahan: You're assuming they would have an interest (with a big smile on his face).

Tilly: Of course you're assuming they would have an interest, or maybe they were getting paid to attend the thing.

Mr. McClanahan: That's a dubious assumption. Oh . . . (long pause), maybe offer a few case studies on how campaigns were conducted. That, I find that interesting. Stories of past battles and how they can frequently turn on trivial, unexpected things.

Tilly: Do you think a review of our current doctrine would be important within that kind of forum? So that they could understand how, within our current doctrine, we would wage a campaign?

Mr. McClanahan: Yea, as long as it was really boiled down, to the point.

Tilly: Short, right to the point.

Mr. McClanahan: Yea, like Colonel Wass de Czage did by demonstrated in five minutes, he attacked with a couple of, a salt and pepper shaker, and blocked with delicatessen tooth picks.

Tilly: Is that right (laughing)?

Mr. McClanahan: Yea, and he showed how he would slow these guys down with air power. . .

Tilly: The whole idea of going deep, separating echelons?

Mr. McClanahan: Right, exactly.

Tilly: Well let me ask you, do you see any benefits coming from this kind of a thing, this idea of educating reporters on the operational level of warfare?

Mr. McClanahan: Well, the risk for you is the same for us. . . in developing sources. People move around a lot. You may invest a lot of time with this person, and they may end up covering city hall. In that case the knowledge wouldn't be that useful. (Long pause). See, there's a natural tension here, that you're not ever, ever going to get around. And that is, that reporters will assume, with varying degrees, that they're not getting the whole truth. They know that if things go badly, the military has a built-in incentive not to tell the full scope of what happened. For national security reasons, or for selfish institutional reasons. And so, reporters must constantly test and hear from the official line, with what they see and hear first-hand. And so when the Pentagon has the kind of restrictions we had in the Gulf War, they restricted interviews, they restricted. . . , you couldn't interview the romantic Ernie Pile- kinda soldier without being accompanied by an Army FLAC.

This is extremely frustrating to reporters. Now the Pentagon may have felt they had reasons to do that. You know, after the reporting of Tet, it's hard to blame them (the Pentagon). Its, a . . . it's very frustrating to reporters if they feel like, if something's just not right, if their instincts tell 'em that something isn't right and they can't verify it. . . than the distrust will grow. And it's something you can't extinguish, you just have to, you just have to manage.

Tilly: From your perspective, how do you work around that? I've seen that tension, I've seen that. I've seen the reporters that were hand carried out to the units, with a PAO right beside them. But I've also seen reporters who spent months with soldiers, riding in their tracks with them, getting to know them, with only the people around them that would normally be there.

Mr. McClanahan: You mean once the ground attack started?

Tilly: Yes, sir. And a good friend of mine, Dave Francavelli, had a reporter sitting in the back of his Bradley Fighting Vehicle, with a lap-top computer and some kind of down-link. He had open access to he and his soldiers (we now talked about that reporters activities with the infantry unit he was with). But it comes back to, to you (in the media) have an agenda, you have an objective, as does the military guy.

Mr. McClanahan: Exactly. There are conflicting interests there . . . the best that we can hope for is that they're managed. They were not managed very well in Vietnam. That goes back to the strategy. We did not have a strategy for victory, so that the briefings began to not have any credibility. And so, as this guy who wrote the book pointed out, when suddenly the briefers were right, and said . . . Tet '68, it's a victory. We have eliminated the VC as an effective fighting force, after that the war became, very much, a conventional war. But . . . that's not how it was written. It was written as if, reporters had been told, month after month, that we can see the light at the end of the tunnel. A major attack has happened, it was not expected. Therefore, the people who've been telling us this stuff, don't really know what's going on. Therefore everything else they've been telling us is suspect. They happened to be right.

Tilly: So the very principle of credibility is, as Public Affairs doctrine states, it has to be honest it has to be truthful, that had been compromised, violated. Blatantly in that case.

How do you tell your reporters. . .

Mr. McClanahan: I don't have any reporters, I'm editorial.

Tilly: Right, well in general.

Mr. McClanahan: You mean, just within the newspaper, like.

Tilly: Yea. How do you tell your folks to handle



situations where they feel like they're not getting the straight stuff from the PAO, or soldier they're talking with. Do you tell them to trust their instinct, to try to work with the PAO? To dig where they can?

Mr. McClanahan: Well, if you're a reporter, and you see an contradiction, you do a follow-up. And you put down the explanation, whatever it is. You try to reflect the reality.

Tilly: Is there any kind of dogma, or dogmatic approach when it comes to dealing with the military? That you have seen.

Mr. McClanahan: Not really. There are a lot things in journalism that are unspoken. Not rules, but conventions. Conventions change. There are assumptions in the air almost like oxygen. Some politicians have credibility. Well let's say, so-and-so is described as 'controversial,' that's a journalistic euphemism for appalling.

Tilly: (Laughing). Well, now I'm getting smarter. That's interesting. Do you think, I've been toying with a few ideas of how we can improve the dialogue between the military and the media. Give you a little background. (At this point I quickly described Carl's trilogy of government, public, and military, and how the media is often the counter-weight of the balance, and often the mechanism through which one knows what the others doing or thinking).

It was at this point that the tape ran out on one side and I had to switch it over to the other side and begin recording anew. For some reason the recording failed to occur on the back side of the tape. We only spoke briefly during this later portion and not a lot was lost.

Tilly's note: From the written notes I took during the interview, the one last point worth mentioning was his reference again to the lack of continuity in educating reporters about operational warfare, and then the possible risk of them being assigned to another area all together outside the military realm. This lack of continuity, or loss of institutional knowledge of certain areas, due to the

rotation of reporters, is a tough reality within the media field.

## APPENDIX D:

### LEWIS INTERVIEW

Notes from 22 February 1995 interview with Mr. Mike Lewis, Assignment Editor, KDAF television, Kansas City.

After the initial introduction I provided Mr. Lewis a copy of the research question and the interview questions. Next followed a quick review of the three levels of warfare, aided by the use of a black board, highlighting operational level warfare.

Tilly: What is your background in journalism or television and can you tell me about what experience you have had in dealing with the military?

Mr. Lewis: I went to the University of Kansas, I went through two of their journalism sequences, I started out in newspaper, as such worked on the University Daily Kansan then went into the broadcasting sequencing. Graduated from KU with a journalism degree in '73. Since then I've worked in radio or television, five years in Topeka at a radio/television station. One year in Kansas City at a radio station, and then, however many is left, seventeen years, no - what, thirteen years - since 1978 I've been at WDAF TV. Rarely has it been, only in Topeka was it on-air circumstance. Most of my work now is gathering information, organizing it, and assigning reporters. So that's been my experience. My experience with the military has strictly been, let's see, ah, my first experience with the military was covering in Topeka was covering a training exercise at Fort Riley. After that it's been, it's all been strictly in training, or covering situations, such as Court Martials. What else would be a good example? During Desert Storm we tried to cover what local units, what their involvement was

going to be. For the most part, regular Army over at Fort Riley, watching them prepare.

Tilly: Did you have anyone over in the Gulf, with the 1st ID?

Mr. Lewis: We did not, never did. When we were getting ready to go, and a number of stations had sent folks over, with their Guard units, or Reserve units, or whatever. But by the time we were getting ready to go, they had shut down the media link. There were times they were taking people over, units would take folks with them, but that quit. So we did a lot of preparation stuff, the 24th Marines, Fort Riley, a number of Guard units, some transportation units. We were doing stories with them, their background, their preparation, their training, and of course their loading up and their transportation over there, but we never did go to the Gulf. I would say the majority of the coverage was Guard units or Reserve units. Fort Riley sticks in my mind a couple of times.

Tilly: And that was from here, your station here?

Mr. Lewis: We would send a TV crew over to Fort Riley, cover them. And I think when they returned, I think they came into. . . I think Topeka. We have from time to time done pieces at Fort Leavenworth. Mostly, there was a lot of publicity given to some of the brochures they prepared for commanders. Getting to the Gulf, Fighting in the Gulf. I think there were three, that I recall. Little pamphlets, basic "how-to" kind of things.

Tilly: I remember them handing one of those out to us as we were getting ready to get on the plane on the way over there.

Mr. Lewis: Is that right (we both shared a laugh)? And we've done a piece or two up there, ah . . . training with computers. We did a story with computer-helicopter simulation. We did some stuff with infantry, armor, ah . . . all that stuff with simulation. There's an on-going interest there because of the high-tech nature, that's interesting. And obviously it's a local, regional focus in

our area, too.

Tilly: Now does your position require you to stay on top of most of those areas, most of those story subjects, in those different areas?

Mr. Lewis: During the Gulf War, as that got going, I was responsible to stay in touch with Adjutant Generals in both states, to find out which units were deploying, time tables and all, and which units were going, that sort of thing.

Tilly: Now were you dealing with their Public Affairs Officers (PAOs), by and large, for most of that information?

Mr. Lewis: By and large, yea.

Tilly: I have been looking at the relationship between the media and the military, and how over time through history, that relationship has developed. How important do you think it is that the media, particularly the television medium, and military have a good relationship?

Mr. Lewis: It's extremely important to have a good relationship of trust. And I guess it is different at my level, than, say at CNN, or at the national level. [This point about the relationship differing at the local vs. the national level comes out in Jerry Fogel's interview as well. Tilly's notes.] It's very important for me to be able to call up Janet Wray (Ft. Leavenworth Public Information Officer) and say, "Look Janet, we're doing 'this' story, and we want to do this and we want to do that." And for her to be able to say, "Well, okay, you can do this, and we can let you do that, but we can't let you do the other thing." And this is the kind of stuff you just have to work through, and develop that trust around. That way you kinda' know what the other person expects from you, and what you can expect from one another. But in a case where you're dealing with a bunch of strangers, and you have a pack kinda' journalism going, it's a totally different kind of thing. It's a different kind of situation, there's less trust and rightfully so. You just don't know everybody, and you have to control everything. I have no qualms about the military needing to guard secrets, it's part of the business,

everybody does, the only difference is that with the military it's life or death national security. But everybody out there has a secret that, for competitive reasons, they don't want anybody to know. So that shouldn't be a big shock for anybody. I think a good relationship is very important. I think a good relationship changes with your point of view.

Tilly: That's very good to here you say that, in terms of recognizing the occasional need to maintain some kind of, what we call, operational security. (We then discussed operational security. Next we discussed Clausewitz's trinity of government, public, and military. I suggested that the media has a major impact on the balance between those three, and that we have often noted during the school year how we could have profited with the attendance of a media representative during our class discussions. We then turned our focus back to the relationship between the media and the military). How would you characterize the relationship between the media and the military, locally and then nationally?

Mr. Lewis: Locally I think, as far as I know, it's pretty cooperative. Janet Wray and I know each other by name, a good relationship. I don't deal as much with Ft Riley. We have news releases pretty regularly, from, we've been to Whiteman Air Base several times. So I think the people from the stations know the PIOs (Public Information Officers, part of the PAO staff) pretty well, around this area. And ah, so I think it's pretty good. But, now, it hasn't come to a point of push come to shove, as it would at a national level. Like a Gulf War, where the competition among the journalist is much higher, the interests among those journalists is going to be much more diverse. For instance, in Kansas City (KC) the four network stations, I mean, we are all fairly main stream. Now, we are all fairly competitive. And there were instances in the past where I've thought that one or the other may have acted, almost irresponsibly, out of competitive, because of the competitive urge, not necessary because of the military. When you get at the national level, you throw in the tabloids, and the foreign journalists, and who have a completely different take on things, over and above the

major networks, who I would view a little more main stream, like what I view we are. But there is such a diversity of attitude, and what they feel is a correct way of operating. I would think there is a much bigger, a much more reason for being conservative on the part of the news source than in the military.

So that's a way of saying nationally, I have no idea. I would guess, nationally I would guess, from sitting back here in KC, I can only guess that it is not unlike the relationship between the military and the media is not unlike any governmental entity of President, the congress, and that is, a guarded give and take, a loyal opposition, using one another to each other's advantage. You know, I have something, or I can help you with some publicity here, do you have some information I can use? I want to float an idea.

Tilly: Do you see that competitive nature, as much more visual, much more apparent at that level, than, say, at your level, as you just described?

Mr. Lewis: Yea, I think so. Again, I haven't lived in it that much. For instance, when we talk to people who are putting together plans for an airport, let's say for an airport is putting together plans for an airplane emergency crash, people who have been through it, in other airports. People will tell them, it's not the locals you have to worry about, it's the people from outa' town, who you have to worry about. These people, these people in your town you don't have to worry about, they'll behave, they have to continue to live around you. But now, these from outa' town, they're the ones you have to watch. Not necessary the tabloids or networks, but just other stations from outa' town. They don't care, they won't have to come back and ask you for favors later on. They'll be climbing over fences and everything.

Tilly: So they don't worry about how they'll be perceived, or their manners, they just gotta get the story?

Mr. Lewis: And they will be gone tomorrow.

Tilly: So consequently, you would see different types of behavior, you would see people trying to develop relationships with that source differently than, based then on that local or national perspective?

Mr. Lewis: A network correspondent whose beat is the Pentagon, is going to be much better behaved, than somebody from the tabloid show who is going to cover O.J. (O. J. Simpson) the next week, and just happened to be covering the death, for instance, of the death of the Rangers, the exposure death of some Rangers this week. And then boom he's gone. But whereas the network correspondent he may be after the same story, and he may be just as hard, but he knows he's gonna' have to keep coming back to you, because you're living together.

Tilly: And you have to keep working that relationship.

Mr. Lewis: For better or worse, yea. Just like a marriage.

Tilly: Looking now at question five, if I described the three levels of warfare, would you feel comfortable with your ability to distinguish between the three. I think maybe now you have a little bit better idea of that (the differences between the three), but the point of this question, is do you think it is important in your business, at your level where you are, where you are at, to be able to distinguish between the three? I guess, looking at my question, that really comes back to what's the story you're trying to capture, or what's the story you're trying to gather.

Mr. Lewis: My first inclination, Phil, is to say no (to be able to make that distinction between the three) not as much where we are because we're kinda' at the bottom of the food chain. The big story for us is, reservist, who got a quicker job at Piggly-wiggly, and suit-up and get on a plane and leave Dad, or Mom, or whomever behind. Obviously it's important for us to know how that works, and what the rules are and all that sort of thing. So that we don't describe something that is incorrect. But I don't know if that means we know what the three levels of warfare are, I think we



just need to be familiar with the way the system works, how somebody is called up, what the rules are in terms of deployment and that sorta' thing. Like when we got into the situation with Dr. Huet Vaughn, who is the reservist, doctor, who declined not to go. So what's the law, what's the rule? So we had to become instant experts. And what kind of rules she was breaking, or did she think she wasn't breaking.

Tilly: So you have to speak from knowledge. . .

Mr. Lewis: Well yea, it's the difference from letting the news source telling the story, or you providing some kind of referee, so there's some kind of balance to the story.

Tilly: If you consider the level of reporting you work a lot of stories from, and Mr. McLanahan told me about this quality in yesterday's interview, one of the things that might develop from educating reporters about the operational level of warfare would be their enhanced ability to do "predictive" journalism. In other words, to say, "in the normal way the military does things, we might next expect to see over the next 72 to 96 hours, the following things. . .". I don't know if that same kind of predictive ability is something you strive for. I know you have to be careful about how you do that, if you say "they're going to go right, and they go left." Then your audience says, "hum, some kind of credibility, here?" Do you look to capture, to some degree, that same predictive capability?

Mr. Lewis: Predictive, not so much to actually do the predicting, but to anticipate a move. In other words, if something happened, it would be helpful to know how, for instance, a call-up would work. Like we knew there was a Marine (Corps) unit here. So that when stuff started to happen, we knew to just start calling up people - anybody who wears a uniform and saying, "hey, have you heard anything?" But, had we thought about it, and now we do, we know to call up Fort Leavenworth. We say, you got this fire fight over here, are you doing any preps for Somalia, are you doing any preps, any pamphlets like you did before? Anything you guys are doing relative to that, because now we've figured out, that once the Army gets into something

there's a think-tank up at Fort Leavenworth that tries to support 'em, with something, something. And so we always call, and I think that Janet, usually will tell us that it is pretty hush, hush, usually, until it blows over, but at least we know to ask the question. That kinda' predictive . . . rarely would our folks go on the air and say "they've done this, therefore that means this." But we would position ourselves so that if that kinda' reaction happened, we could cover it.

Tilly: If you had that kind of, at least locked up here in your mind as a reporter or director, if you had the ability to say (or recognize) well, I know that this might be the normal sequence of this kind of ground campaign, and you could position your reporters to where you could say, be prepared to ask the commander these kinds of things because this might be the sequence they'll occur in. Do you think that might be an advantage to you? What I'm trying to do is to distinguish what might be short-term requirements you have and reporting, and what might be a certain institutional base of knowledge that allows you to get just a little bit below the surface and provide more explanation of the news, rather than just the "here's what happened" kind of stuff. And I know you have to be careful how you balance that. How would you approach that?

Mr. Lewis: Again, we would not make the prediction ourselves, for instance. We would present the news. But if we had the, as you say, the operational knowledge, we would go to a commander or whomever, or official, and ask those questions in order to provide more depth to the viewer. And that is certainly an advantage. Because people are hungry, just beyond just what happened. They are in many instances hungry for why something happened.

Tilly: Can you tell me what you do to prepare a reporter before they go out to cover a military story. Do you have a "Smart Book" that says "Here are the two hundred and twelve acronyms you're likely to here," or, maybe, here is a point of contact to get with initially at the post and then branch out from there? How do you go about it?

Mr. Lewis: Embarrassingly, it is typically, in a day to day

situation, in a non-conflict kind of situation, it is something that we may have stumbled across that is a training phenomenon, that is interesting, or that we have been alerted to by the installation. So typically, there is really little preparation besides what information the information officer has provided to us. And we just pretty much throw ourselves on the mercy of the court. And we say, "Okay, what's this all about, what is the significance of this thing, what is the cost, okay, and is this the right way to do things? And what kind of success or failures have you had with it?" And then, quite frankly, the job begins to interpreting anything, or the jargon, of the military. It could be anybody, though, it could be city hall, it could be engineers. Changing that into everyday language so that the folks out in the audience can understand.

Tilly: Is that a problem in your area, of institutional familiarity, in terms of continuity, of reporters? Are you always able to assign "a" reporter to go to Leavenworth to cover things, so that there is a certain familiarization with the people, maybe some of the ideas and things that go on up there?

Mr. Lewis: No. There have been instances where people have made it their area of interest. And therefore might develop stories that go beyond stories that are handed out by the military. So that they might be aware of things going on, and might generate the stories themselves. But we are not at the point, and I don't think there is any TV station in Kansas City, that's at a point where one person does just the military.

Tilly: It would be hard to have that kind of depth (of personnel) to spread yourself around?

Mr. Lewis: Unfortunately it is. As opposed to the paper, which I would guess, is probably a lot closer to being able to do that, I would guess.

Tilly: I'm not even sure if the paper has that kind of depth either. My impression from yesterday's interview is that they don't always enjoy that kind of latitude either. He told me you just kinda' jump into the "bath water" with

whomever you have, point them in the right direction, give them some names of people, telephone numbers, and some sources. But often times that changes and a new reporter wants to find new sources, new people to contact, and doesn't use the earlier information.

Do you think it would be beneficial, and I have to take this in consideration of your level and your focus, but do you think it would be beneficial if your reporters received some type of formal, or even informal, kinda' of familiarization or training or just active dialogue with some military folks to orient them to recognizing your focus at the tactical level, or maybe the operational level?

Mr. Lewis: It would. The problem many times is. You call us up and say you're having this nice day out here, and you chopper us out to Fort Riley, and put you back of an armored personnel carrier. We'll take you out to a range, bring you in, show you a communications center, some maps, the satellite global positioning thing, and then you would ask - well, how many people can you send. And I would say, well, maybe one because I have to use the rest to fill my newscast today. Now, what I would probably do, would be to send a reporter, maybe an assignment editor, or gather whoever I could, and maybe myself - who actually assigns people. But the problem is that, we who actually do the reporting and directing of news gathering, we don't have time to be educated like that.

Tilly: So you would be giving up productivity time and products for your newscasts in order to enhance your familiarization with something?

Mr. Lewis: Yea. Many times what people have done, is people come by the station and say I'm from Leavenworth, or even Whiteman Air Force Base, and say here is some stuff I have for you about 'this.' And they get ready for our questions, and make the base available to us. Like the B-2s at Whiteman, that was a pretty controlled thing, you know the plane, and all. They could tell you what needed to be known, and you really didn't need to understand anything beyond that. But, it would be really a challenge to have a good, comprehensive program for reporters about the

operational level of the military.

Tilly: I had played with the thought of looking at some case studies. Looking at the Gulf War, reviewing some of the terminology associated with the operational level. Also centers of gravity, operational lines, culminating points, decisive points, and the many things that make up those terms at the operational level. Look at some of the things we consider, things we focus on as we develop plans and determine how we will wage warfare. The advantage I can see is taking the audience from the tactical level, going one step beyond what the 1st Infantry Division is doing by destroying two divisions of the enemy corps we're attacking, and by illustrating or describing what the contribution is in terms of the big picture. Here is the piece that this division's actions have made, looking at it in terms of the entire ground operation. It gets into operational security issues, but I think there must be audience out there that would like to hear about it.

Mr. Lewis: I think there is a lot of it. Even if you just figure retired military people. You gotta' figure. . . there's a lot of pockets out there. But you're right about, when does it stop being informational and start being dangerous? Here's a thought that comes at you from a totally different point of view. What made me think about it was finding time to send them to you to get them educated. There may be graduate level courses at MU and KU that might consider looking at the military. I don't know what they might include, maybe just your three circles (illustrating strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war). I mean we do it with city hall, and we cover the city hall stuff more, but if we have another Gulf War, you'll need that information. There may be some places where they may want some more detail than other places, like around Fort Hood, down in Texas, you know. But KU, they're turning out people who work around Fort Riley, Wichita, and other places near where the military is. (We then discussed other options at KU to look at expanding military familiarity).

The advantages of starting it off in college, is they're not under the time-productivity crunch, they're students where they can learn the stuff, have time to digest and really get

to know it. In some cases these are graduate level students, who are motivated to be there by their own initiatives, who may also come with some prior military experience as well. But at least they will want to learn how this all works.

Tilly: How do you think your audience would be interested in getting into the operational detail, or would they want to get into the operational detail of the, for instance Gulf War, or would they want to keep their focus at the tactical level?

Mr. Lewis: We actually went to some pains to find retired military who were military historians, or strategists, or had a history with, one fellow had been with the CIA, anybody who could give us a bigger picture.

Tilly: So you went to find a military, so called "expert," to fill a void then, if you would.

Mr. Lewis: And we had to fall back on people who were retired, one generation removed. Because we couldn't go up to Fort Leavenworth and say "tell me what's going on here," and expect somebody to answer that question. But, they can tell you, just like a football analyst who wasn't in the locker room, they're gonna' know, just like you say, they'll have an operational level, they're gonna' know general rules and guidelines, and they're gonna' be able to give people a degree of context that we can't, just because we don't know.

So we're always looking for experts.

Tilly: That must have been an interesting search.

Mr. Lewis: Well our degree, our success was spotty. We had a guy, World War II, who kept up. Who knows how good it was, or how accurate it was. People are Fort Leavenworth, you know, were probably at home like this (puts his hands in front of his face and shakes his head back and forth - we both laugh). But on the other hand, he was probably close enough, he gave you another inkling of what was going on.

Tilly: I wonder how much support you might actually receive

from Leavenworth. And I recognize that the operational security issues are a factor. I just wonder how much active support you might get.

If you were going to structure some kind of program to address this kind of stuff, what would you envision being in it?

Mr. Lewis: See, I can never remember how big a division is, what's in it. But I can see, maybe, some case histories, Schwartzkopf tapes, that kind. It might be interesting too, from a military point of view. Say you want Leavenworth to take on being a source of expert, commentary. So that's pretty tricky business for somebody. That would certainly take a lot of practice. So you show a reporter and a military officer some piece of coverage from the tactical level of the Gulf War, "I'm Peter Arnett from Baghdad." And so then you let this reporter turn to this officer and let him start asking some typical questions and see how far you can let it go and how far you can't. (I then reviewed some of the formal training we receive in the Command and General Staff College in dealing with the media, and then related how this was also incorporated into the 'Prairie Warrior' Command Post Exercise training).

Tilly: Let me close with the last question. Can you see any positive benefits developing from such an effort, if we did try to structure an operational level orientation or course, maybe a dialogue with some of my folks, my folks - our folks to come down and talk with some of your folks.

Mr. Lewis: Yea, any time you can, to the degree that we cover the military, which is in spurts and fits here in Kansas City, to the degree that we cover a subject the more that we know about it the better we are.

Tilly: Thanks for letting me take up some of your time today.

## APPENDIX E:

### RINEHART INTERVIEW

Notes from 22 February 1995 interview with Miss Lisa Rinehart, reporter, WDAF TV, Kansas City.

Tilly: Can you tell me about yourself, a little bit about your background, what kind of journalism stuff you've looked at and if you've had any experience with dealing with the military at all.

Miss Rinehart: Sure, it goes back to high school. I went to one of those large high schools that has the fortune of having its own television studio, an entire class in mass media. And we would put on a very basic cable show, once every couple of weeks. It was in Tulsa (Oklahoma). Well, it's actually called Jinks (sp?) High School, right outside Tulsa. But a couple of the schools around here have that wonderful resources. So I really got the basics of shooting video, learning about it. And it really gave me an interest. So I went to school at KU and studied broadcast news and French, and went abroad for a year and studied in France to finish my degree. When I came back I started really focussing on my journalism, which was my senior year, plus a fifth year, since I had been in France for that one year, I still had my last year to go. So my fifth year I got an internship here, I started here as a paid intern. A Sue Parsel's scholarship winner, which is a scholarship they offer to female KU broadcast students. It was a wonderful opportunity, I got to work full time, and got paid for it as an intern, which is unheard of, to get paid as an intern. So I did that, went to work, got another internship in Topeka, where I worked every weekend and some holidays for free at KSMT, the NBC affiliate, then I got a job at WABW, the CBS affiliate working over the Christmas break through to the next semester. So I was working there on weekends,



and going to school, and then I got a job here as an associate producer here at Channel 4. Which meant I came back and started in April, three years ago. An associated producer's position is like a glorified intern. You just do a little bit of everything. You run scripts, you might do lights, you might go out on stories, you're not a reporter, but you might go get a sound bite, for shorter stories you might edit, you might look up file tape. You would do anything the producers or the reporters might need you to do. You're just kinda' there everyday.

Tilly: You're getting lots of experience through that kind of thing, I would think.

Miss Rinehart: Sure, it's a good entry level position. Often that leads to producer's positions, often that leads to reporter's positions. In my case, it lead to a reporter's position. So that's how it happened, and six months later I had already started reporting a six-days a week, they needed someone on the weekends to report. And so I started to do that, and then they put me two days a week, three days a week, four days a week, I was reporting, so that by the time I had been here six months I became a reporter. At least officially, in title I guess. That's basically it, I reported general assignment during that time, and then in December of 1994, I was fortunate enough to get a co-anchor position on the morning, weekend morning show. Which is my first anchor job, and I co-anchor with John Holt. And it's new for me, and it's fun. And that's the weekends and I'm a special assignments reporter three days a week.

Tilly: (At this point I handed Miss Rinehart a copy of the interview questions I was going to use and then asked her to expand on her experience in dealing with the military).

Miss Rinehart: I guess I didn't answer the second part of that question, about dealing with military affairs. The answer would be yes, some experience. Basically doing some stories over at Fort Leavenworth, stories during the PG, of course we were interested. We did different updates, we did some on different strategies that might be, ah. . . we tried to get as many different angles of course, out of the

military-type stories as possible. We had dealings with the military in Topeka, it could have been many different things. I've been to Fort Riley, but, . . . unfortunately, that often had to do with people getting in trouble, over there. Big Red One. A fun story I did was on the big fire-works show I did, I covered that at Fort Leavenworth.

Tilly: Fourth of July, I guess.

Miss Rinehart: Yea, but that still requires an effort of going through all the layers to get, you know, get all of your clearance, we don't want any military police to be . . . It could range from Veteran's Day. I did a story on Veterans who were being recognized for, something special, years later. It could be any number of things. I've never covered the military full time, as some reporters could, in a city where there's a military base and a smaller market, where someone could specialize in the military. Then again, in a smaller city, that's kinda' your focus.

Tilly: (At this point I explained the curriculum of SAMS, our focus at the operational level, and the focus of the research). Are you familiar with the three levels of warfare?

Miss Rinehart: I would say, no.

Tilly: (I then explained the differences between the three levels, illustrating each by what it might equate to on the battlefield, and the names or positions associated with each. I then reviewed the research question and the direction I wanted the research to head). So my research is looking at how we could educate the media on operational warfare and are there any benefits that could come from it?

Miss Rinehart: I think that's interesting. So would this be at a time of war, or prior to any conflict erupting? Would this be now that we would start talking about it?

Tilly: I had not thought about it in terms of time. Because if you tried to do it during wartime, with bullets already flying, it would be hard to steel time to make it happen. I guess in a time of war, we could do a condensed

version if operations did kick off. I have been looking at how this relationship has developed over time, between the media and the military. (I then went over some of my research looking at this historical relationship, and introduced the idea of operational security into the discussion). How do you see the relationship, between the media and the military, here at the local level? Here in the Kansas City area?

Miss Rinehart: You know, initially, I would say, when you say dealing with the military in Kansas City, I immediately think of Fort Leavenworth. Because that's our biggest conglomeration of big military, close by. I know we have installments here. I know we'll occasionally have the reserves, and things like that. I would say, on a day to day basis, it's fine. I would not say it's a confrontational, tense . . . sorta' dealing, and we certainly have that with the police, for instance, and the prosecutor's office. (She then related to me some of the different occasions when friction developed between the station and local institutes). I think during the times of tense. . . where you're sending off troops, yeah, we're pressing for information. We're pressing them, they're pressing for us not to have it, you know, that's standard, we expect it to happen. I would not by any means characterize it as a bad relationship.

Tilly: What about at the national level, how would you characterize it at the national level?

Miss Rinehart: National level, and this is only, keeping in mind a young journalist's point of view, who has not covered it at the national level. What I perceived, for example, during the Persian Gulf, compare to Vietnam. Of course, I was an infant. . . or young child during Vietnam. There was freedom, lot's of freedom. Journalists, journalists could go everywhere. Cameras, film cameras were everywhere, everywhere, seeing everything. There was a lot more control during the Gulf. Lot more restrictions. There was a lot of tension going on, on behalf of the media who had been at the other one, who were saying, "Hey, wait a minute. . .

Tilly: "We didn't do it this way last time. . ."

Miss Rinehart: "What's going on here, why are you being up front, friendly fire, why are people dieing, what's going on with that?" And I think there was a lot of tension, much more tension, in comparing the two. Much more on the side of the Gulf War, much more tension, then not being able, not saying anything.

I would say, on a day to day basis, I don't know. Nationally, I think there's always going to be the element of tension. Us wanting to know, them not wanting us to know (we both laugh at this point).

Tilly: How did your education, you're not too long from the world of academe, how did your education prepare you for dealing with the military?

Miss Rinehart: Very basic. I would say I was not prepared. And as in many careers, you find out it is mostly . . . on the job training. You sorta' learn. And it wasn't until when I got to a news room in Topeka, and needed to go to Fort Riley, they said, well hey, you've got to contact them PIO (Public Information Officer), and this is the way you do it. And I would say that's how I learned. In dealing repeatedly. I would say I know I had no formal education talking about, uhm, . . .

Tilly: Would that have been beneficial, looking back now? Would you have gained anything? Prior to getting thrown into . . . ?

Miss Rinehart: Oh, absolutely. I think anytime you can learn, anytime you can be prepared for different situations. I think a class, maybe an optional class, on the military, would be, maybe, a good idea. Yet, even if it were required, I don't think that would be a bad idea either. Because, we all encounter the military from time to time. I think it might come in the form of the military, plus corporate, dealing with corporate people - that's an entire beast in itself. PR (Public relations), plus dealing with police. There are lots of questions we deal with on a day to day basis, and I would have loved that.

Tilly: So I guess a lot of what you have to deal with, as a

reporter in your particular field of television journalism, a lot of it just comes from experience. Just having to throw yourself, as someone said once, throw yourself into the bathwater and getting wet with it.

Miss Rinehart: Yes, absolutely. You can just learn so much from the text books. This is one of those fields that you just have to do it.

Tilly: As you look at that relationship, between the media and the military, how do you see the media's effect upon that relationship? Do you think the aspect of competition has an awful lot to do with how that whole relationship is approached, at least from the media's side?

Miss Rinehart: I think, it's important for everyone to realize. . .I'll talk from the media to the military here. It's important for the military to realize, our goal is our deadline. Our goal is to get all that we can by the deadline. Granted, beating the competition, and having a scoop is fine, but, I do not know one person, and, having so far done this for four years, I don't know one person who would ever want to risk security on any person. Much less troops, individuals. . . If we are told, all you can tell us, and no one else gets more, then that's the end of it. If it is a situation of, we know this, this, and this, and off the record, we may have some arrests tomorrow, call us tomorrow - we will respect that. And not violate that, because it is our reputation, it's our livelihood, we have to, we have to have you trust us. But on the other hand, we have to know that we are getting the same as the others are. But there is often the impression, on behalf of the police, on behalf of the media, on behalf of the military, on behalf of political groups, on behalf of lots of groups, that we have a hidden agenda. Our only agenda is our deadline. That's our agenda.

Tilly: I've never heard it, captured quite that way.

Miss Rinehart: That is my agenda. And if, I know that by reporting a particular item, is going to in any way, going to harm another human being, much less a group of human beings, I would never put that on. And I think a lot of

reporters, I would say, I would venture to say, almost every reporter is like . . me. Or like us, and if we know, getting back to your education, why certain things couldn't be said, then no ones going to want to touch it. 'Cause they don't want Americans to lose their lives overseas either, or even locally. And I think that's one thing where education would be key, understanding. . . when you say tactical would be this and this, we want, we want our viewers to be informed, but our viewers don't want, they don't need, and I don't believe, they don't want to know so much information that would also risk someone's safety.

Tilly: I agree with that assessment, I think that's pretty accurate. One of the things I was talking to Tom (accidentally referred to Mike Lewis as Tom, throughout the interview) upstairs was the difference between the way, for instance, a local station like you, would operate in comparison to say, a tabloid, network, or national effort. (We then discussed this local, "neighbor-like" approach from local stations, compared to how other media, outside your geographical area, might conduct themselves). And that makes a real difference, I think.

Miss Rinehart: That's true, and I think if I were in a position, like a Public Information Officer, or PAO - is that it (I nodded yes), then I would be extremely concerned about that. Yet I would hope, and I am somewhat optimistic, I am still fairly new at the whole game, but I would be fairly optimistic, that you could say, "I'll give your everything I can, and that means this, this, and this. That's all you're going to get, that's as far as I can go, here's why - and that's it." And then people know - they can't get any more than that.

You bring up a good point, because there are always going to be people who. . .

Tilly: Want to dig.

Miss Rinehart: And they pay for interviews, which we don't, and networks don't pay for interviews either. You know, network news. Where you will get the cousin of that pilot, who went down to Fort Riley, and say. . . and they will say

that if they're going to get \$5,000.00.

Tilly: I would tell you that the bulk of American television watchers would look at that and say, this is yellow journalism, I don't need to spend my time looking at this, this is trash TV, and I sure don't need to spend my time devoting effort to this.

Miss Rinehart: I would hope. . .

Tilly: As you look at these three levels of warfare, and having spoken to Tom (Mike) about this as well, you spend a lot of your time, at least here at your station, looking at the tactical level of warfare.

Miss Rinehart: Yeah.

Tilly: You look at the Guard units, the reserves from around here, you look at the folks at Fort Riley. If you notched that up and you start to consider the operational level of warfare, in terms of maybe being able to explain things. Explain things in a little better detail, like, the Big Red One's contribution to the overall ground campaign is this. Do you think your audience, given the demographics of what you have in Kansas City, do you think they would be interested in operational terms?

Miss Rinehart: That's always an interesting idea, because in television we have an additional concern that a newspaper doesn't, and those are visuals. What can we visualize? Meaning, if, say we came up with a story like this, say, operational warfare, I would say no. If there are troops are their way, possibly, say, to Somalia. And my brother is maybe, going to get drafted, and there's something that would tie, there's a impending story military-wise, that would be an interesting, what we would call, a side bar. You here that a lot, in O.J. First of all, we would want to know how many people are they sending, you know, that would be at the tactical level. A side-bar story would be, well why, what's going on with this. Well the operational team, they feel, for, ah, in Somalia, that a ground attack is gonna' be much more effective than an air attack, and here's why. That would be an interesting side-bar, we could show

graphics, we could show the land, the terrain, why air isn't better. And I think that would be an interesting story. Television also, we are up against the challenge of keeping it conversational. Getting into lots and lots of detail looses people. Because in a newspaper, you can sit there and read it over and over, and study it. In television you have to get it one time, or else people are lost.

Tilly: Yeah, the thirty second film clip, or boom, you've lost the attention span.

Miss Rinehart: And, yeah, we even say, if you don't have them in ten seconds they start zapping (she makes the gesture of channel surfing with a remote). So we've got to make sure it is very clear. Where we would say, (using a deep, announcer's type voice) "According to operational tactics, blah, blah, blah." Instead, we would say, "Why are those troops coming in from the air, and not the ground? And why are they not doing this? And here is why." And keep it in simplistic terms. You have to talk to the average, Joe Six-pack, we call 'im. And while we'd love to be an intellectually stimulating medium, at the same time . . . we have to be realistic. Or people are going to get lost and frustrated.

Tilly: What do you do to prepare a reporter, before they go out to tactical one of these stories? In your experience, is there a "Sit down, I'm going to give you two and half hours of diagrams and video, or here is the smart book, these are all the acronyms you're going to hear, or is it more like, here are three peoples' names, and their phone numbers, call this person before you even leave here?

Miss Rinehart: Maybe that (indicating the later), or sometimes if you're on that tight a deadline, you don't even have that kind of luxury. I have that luxury, doing special projects reporting. Where I can talk to the right person, where I can spend a week on a story, where other people may only have a few hours to spend on a story. So I would get to do that, but speaking on general terms, no. It's, hey, military school, this commander's school, they might have someone there to talk to you about this . . . get on the phone. And you're fast, you're going fast, and that's one



thing a lot of people, the media-savvy people, like the PR firms, they understand we're working on fast deadlines and their key is to get someone fast for us to interview. At that point the reporter gets on the phone, with their Colonel, or Major, or whomever they're going to be talking with, and they figure out what we're going to be talking about. This is our goal-this is what we'll be talking about.

But as far as getting into the details, usually time restricts you from being able to study up. That's not good, but that's reality, especially now that we have an earlier newscast at 9 P.M.

Tilly: Part of my idea behind this research question looking at the operational level, balancing it with what is your focus and what audience does that really apply to, as I try to tackle this research question one of the things I looked at is, if you had a more, well established foundation, say at the tactical level, you might be able to ask better questions. . . .

Miss Rinehart: You're right.

Tilly: You might be able to dig a little deeper, more than just a quick flash. It could still tweak your audience's attention to say, "Hey, that's neat. That's not just now, but that's long term." And you can build from that. What I'm struggling with, is at the operational level, there are obviously security issues you have to be concerned with, you and I have kicked some of those around. But if prior to going in, say the CENTCOM brief that they had in Riyadh, if the reporters knew that a ground campaign normally went through, let's just say, five phases, and they knew that we were at phase two,

Miss Rinehart: YES.

Tilly: And the reporter in the back of the room could say, "General, just in broad terms, could you give us any idea, if you've given any thought to possibly now shifting over to the ground attack, maybe?" And you might just see the inference, the idea that he didn't want to talk about that.

Bells could go off, lights could start flashing.

Miss Rinehart: But we really wouldn't, yeah, but. . .

Tilly: And you have to be careful how you use that.

Miss Rinehart: Because if we risk that, then we risk the whole military operation dumping on us, because "We said we couldn't talk about that."

Tilly: That's right. That is something I am struggling with on this research. At the tactical level it seems easier, because the effects seem to be in the twelve to twenty-four hour time frame. At the operational level, you're looking at ninety-six hours on out. Those kinds of effects, and that media coverage could really be detrimental. I don't know where the happy medium is there.

Miss Rinehart: Well, I think if it's a situation where, ah, things are mobilizing, things are happening. Is your point, that you think it needs to keep quiet, because it could be very detrimental, until the first air strikes do happen? Would you want that media coverage; or would you . . .

Tilly: Or just put it on the back shelf for a while?

Miss Rinehart: If I were in the military, granted, I'm speaking from your side now, but I can see where that could be very dangerous. Unless, there was some reason to warn them, maybe, you want to warn Saddam, whatever, we're coming. But I can see that that is a potentially, possibly, very dangerous situation because the way that media works now, so fast now. With computers, and satellites. One Associated Press wire report gets across the nation in a blink. It's out. Addressing the overall idea, of understanding more, is always a good idea. The idea of specializing, you know, in one area, like military, that's always going to make them better. But reality is, you have a bunch of general assignment reporters up there, some specialize. Like we have who specializes in education, one who does city hall - government, one who does health, and after that, then it's all pretty much general assignment. Which means if something starts happening, we start hearing

rumblings, someone's cousin starts calling from Fort Riley, "hey, they're sending the troops," which quite often happens. "They're mobilizing us, this is off the record." We start making calls. Anyone of those people could be making calls (referring to the general assignment reporters). Anyone who hasn't gone through lots of intensive training with military. I think it is always good, it would be great, but. . .

Tilly: You're just sorta' taking your best shot in some cases, depending on who you're going to send.

Miss Rinehart: Yeah.

Tilly: So the institutional knowledge, the continuity, depends on what's hot - shot term, long term - primarily long term, and what things do you (have to) deal with on a repeating basis, that you need to have continuity.

Miss Rinehart: Yeah. Crime, we do a lot. Where people understand, you know, how they're arrested, they're charged, they'll go before a preliminary hearing. This we see a lot. When we deal with the military it's usually a story of the day and then it's forgotten. [Here is the basis for the problem, Tilly's note]. Then we go on to the next story of the day, and then it's forgotten, and then the next, and it's forgotten. So we're not working this kind of education, which I think would be wonderful, it's just reality is it's just not happening.

Tilly: And it's hard to, and the idea of taking you away from your job, for so long, when you've got deadlines to meet.

Miss Rinehart: Oh yeah.

Tilly: And if you can't specialize in that, depending on what your audience is, can you afford to give up that talent, that effort, and that productivity.

Miss Rinehart: Exactly.

Tilly: If you were going to be charged with putting

together something to forward this education idea, either at the tactical level or building up to the operational level, what would you like to see in that kind of a program? What would be beneficial for you, to allow you to walk away from, not only make you a little more productive, but allow you to do a little bit better job of telling the Army's story?

Miss Rinehart: Easily. We need terms, we need terminology. We need to understand what a ground attack means, basic stuff, stuff that you will laugh at, but, things that a non-military person wouldn't know. What an air-strike means. Deadlines, the order, like the arrest sequence, how an attack works, or if there are different types. And we need pictures [Tilly's note - TV has big emphasis on visual cues]. Pictures and diagrams, of different types of military. That would be very helpful. Now, we could go out there and get that ourselves, but if you were wanting to spoon feed us, this is (laughing) what we are talking about. I could go out and read a book myself. We always like media friendly stuff. "This is an F-16." You know, like what are the big planes being used now, the big tanks being used now.

Tilly: Which for us is second-hand knowledge, distinguishing between the types of equipment.

Miss Rinehart: Exactly. And if they say, "We had this friendly fire attack, and an F-16 went down, and it had two men in it." We could show a picture, of this is an F-16, it holds two people. Basic stuff, I know, but the average Joe Six-pack is like, he needs basics. This is things we like.

Also, and this is for future, having a PAO who understands our needs. Who really understands our needs. I would say, Lieutenant Colonel Gleisburg, great guy. He really understands our needs. When we call, and this could be a reverse education for the military, and I know you don't want to hear about this, but when we call, we don't want to hear about all the channels we have to go through, we don't have time for you guys to have six meetings to discuss it. We need someone, bam, who can discuss it right there. Who can say, this is what we know, just a general spokesperson. And usually that's what we get when we call on the military.

In a situation like that, and we're calling, they need to be ready, you know, have their top layer of people who are educated. This is exactly the way the big companies do it. And if the military acts like IBM, or SPRINT, their PR people are on it. And when we call, like a hospital, "We need a three-legged man who's had cancer in the last six months." They're on it, "We'll call you in five minutes." They have a level of doctors who are experienced in talking with the media. They'll go down and tell them what they need. They are ready. They are open to the concept of now, not two weeks from now, not tomorrow, but today.

That would be, in addition to an education for us, a great education (laughing lightly) for the military. I've gone on a rampage.

Tilly: No, that's great. That's exactly would I'm trying to get at. I think part of that education should be to explain part of that bureaucracy. But part of it too, would include, that only two people are actually authorized to give "the official" party line for a question. Those two people are the commander, and the PAO.

Miss Rinehart: I think if I were the PAO. Sometimes, sometimes we just need to hear something. We don't need to hear all the details, we just need to know that "They're out in the field, and something has happened, I've not heard back from the commander, we don't expect to hear anything back until ten o'clock tonight. Right now we are mobilizing, and we don't have anything else to say." That in itself is enough to let me know, to let our viewers know, that we have the latest information. The latest information is that this guy doesn't have much information. If the PAO gets in front of me, and says, the only one who can give you any information is the commander, and right now he is on a jet, and he's going to this situation. That's enough, that's understandable. Maybe I'm easy going, but I have a father who was in the military, so I understand. But I know that you're under certain kinds of restrictions - all I need is my story. And I need it by five.

Tilly: I am coming to realize, and I don't get points for originality on this one, but we don't have the draft any

more, so consequently we don't see that broad familiarity with military terms and the military at large, with every young man and woman having spent at least two years in some kind of uniform.

Miss Rinehart: That's a really good point.

Tilly: Tom (Mike) was saying that you all went out and actively sought to find military "experts" to comment on on-going operations during the Gulf War. I'm just trying to determine, and I think I know the answer, if it would be beneficial, if things got hot, and if you were in a position to commit a reporter to say, you are now our military link to Fort Leavenworth, who could talk with that kind of familiarity.

Miss Rinehart: It would be good, if they could talk the basics. But we wouldn't want to put one of our reporters in a situation of being an expert. Unless they were a military person. Because, we could do analysis, and this, and this and this. But we call on a general, a General Shirky (Spelling?), and he can say, "Often, this is what will happen in a situation like this." And he is a general, and he would be the person we would want to talk to. But it does require, you're right, an experienced, knowledgeable reporter. Like our political reporter who is going to be doing political analysis on election night. Same deal. A war breaks out, or even a scuffle breaks out, we want that person there, to say ta da ta da ta da. I think it would be a great idea.

Tilly: Do you have anything in mind to just throw out on the topic at all, before I turn off the recorder.

Miss Rinehart: I think I have, you know, mentioned what I feel about the, how you have this tension, about this terrible battle that's going to go on, and I think it's always going to go on, between people who want information and people who have information and don't want to give it back. That's always going to create some tension. I think having an understanding of each other. Military tends to, you know, we kinda' roll our eyes and go "auuugghhh." And Colonel, Major, General, everyone has to sign off on it, and

you're just like, "Gosh, all I want to know is what prisoner is it that's gone nuts in the prison."

Our agenda isn't to undermine anything. It's just to get, to do the best coverage of that story that we can. In the time that we're given. That is important. In addition to my time, it's also trying to have the best story. But it's not trying to sneak anything.

Tilly: It's really refreshing to hear you say that.

## APPENDIX F:

### FOGEL INTERVIEW

Notes from 23 February 1995 interview with Mr. Jerry Fogel, President of Martin Fromm and Associates, Inc.

I began our interview by introducing myself and acquainting Mr. Fogel with the research topic. I also used the "three circles sketch" I had used with Miss Reinhart to illustrate the three levels of warfare before I started recording. Mr. Fogel is unique among the people interviewed for this project in that he has an extensive background in the media, but more importantly, as a member of the military. He reviews that background later in the interview, but brings to our discussion a broad scope of experience from both "sides" of the issue of media and military interaction.

Tilly: First thing I'd like to ask you, sir, is what's your background in the media and what experience do you have in dealing with the military?

Mr. Fogel: I started in the media, actually, in 1953, in college. I was the first voice ever heard in the Military Academy radio station in 1955. I started KDET, actually, it was started by a couple a' Firsties, but, I was a Plebe (Freshmen), but I was the only one who had any radio experience. So I had a show there, and then I after I left the Academy, mid-way through my Yearling year (sophomore), I got into showbusiness full time. I've been doing it every since, radio, television, motion pictures. I came here in 1978, but I was doing a series, so I commuted. And in 1982 I started in radio in Kansas City.

Tilly: Have you been dealing with the military a lot, during your media experiences?



Mr. Fogel: Yeah, I was the PAO, in the those days, PIO, for "E" Company, 16th Special Forces Group, New York National Guard (NG) in the mid-60's. Before that I was the PIO the 27th Armored Division Artillery. I moved to Los Angeles and I was in the 6325th Information, Information something, I don't even know what size unit it was, ah, RTU, Reserve Training Unit. But I don't know what size unit the 6325th was. Everybody was a Colonel or a Major except for me. That's all I remember, in fact one year I went on active duty for ten days. In fact my active duty for training was as assistant PIO at the Military Academy, that was 1965 or 67. I was also an assistant PIO for the New York NG, at this point, even though that I lived in New Jersey. And so I've been connected with the military, I've been a member of AUSA (Association of the United States Army), and I'm an officer of the West Point Society here. Very gung ho, not very knowledgeable (laughing), but gung ho.

Tilly: That's great. It sounds as though you've had a great deal of experience as far as dealing, not only from the media in presenting information, but from the Army side as well as packaging it and working that relationship between the media and the military.

Mr. Fogel: Yeah, but it was a lot easier in those days, though. Back in the 60's.

Tilly: Why was it easier then, sir?

Mr. Fogel: I was going to say because there was a draft, but, uhm, that isn't necessarily true. That didn't make it any easier. Bearing in mind, that I was in the NG. The NG was a haven for people, to some extent, people who wanted to get out of going to Vietnam. So, recruiting was not a problem. The city I was living, Rochester, New York, my home town, was kinda', fairly mid-western in its patriotic vent. And so I . . . pretty good cooperation from the newspaper. Television and radio, I had . . . I was one of them. I mean I had a morning radio program there, so we all knew each other, we were all members of the union, which isn't true of this area. So I had good cooperation.

I don't think that the military is in as advantageous

position today.

Tilly: As far as that relationship goes, between the military and the media?

Mr. Fogel: As far as getting publicity without too much difficulty.

Tilly: What do you attribute that to, sir? Change of times since Vietnam, society, or . . . what would you link that to?

Mr. Fogel: I don't know. (pauses) It goes back to, like, when I entered the Academy in the '50s. The mid-50s was not a good time for the military. Vietnam hadn't even begun, not that anybody knew about . . .

Tilly: Eisenhower was trimming, trimming, trimming. Different focus, nuclear force, . . .

Mr. Fogel: Yeah. And the same thing is happening now. We're trimming drastically. And I think we're, we, the military is in a terrible position now, because when the Joint Chiefs went before the House just yesterday to get more money, the argument came back, at least from one source in the New York Times this morning, you're taking the money from welfare, and children's lunch programs and putting it into the Defense Department. Uhm, that's not true, but that's at least the way it's being presented by the liberals side.

I just think that the military today is in a disadvantageous position. And I'm not sure I know why.

Tilly: Do you think part of that, sir, could be because of the way the military presents itself to society? As far as, not only "this is what we do," but "this is our calling, our mission, this is what we are charged to be able to do?" (I then related to Mr. Fogel that the topic of society and the military is a frequent SAMS discussion point).

Mr. Fogel: I don't think the American society really, except for war time, and I would even include the Gulf War

with that, I don't think the American society ever really accepts the military enough. Accepts is the wrong word . . . respects it enough. If you compare the United States and Great Britain, I mean, it's day and night. The King, his children . . . they're are members of the military. I mean, it's expected of them. I don't know what it is in our background, I guess maybe the citizen soldier has always been, ah, exemplified here, and we're talking about the professional essentially, because there is no more citizen soldier, except in time of war. Everybody is a volunteer today, but it's a different kind of Army, or military.

Tilly: Of course, you still have the Guard and the Reserve, but that has downsized considerably also.

Mr. Fogel: Yeah, and I think there is a lot of negativity that can go along with the Guard, quite frankly. I mean, it's gotten some bad publicity, but over the past year or so. Part, elements of it. Well, even going back to the Gulf War. The troops from down south that were inadequately trained. But the Guard is a very political unit. The fact that the Guard has been able, now, to take over the Special Operations element of the Reserve forces, I think, is a very bad thing. I think it is much too political. But you have members of the House and the Senate, and I think that may have a lot to do with it. And I think that people equate, maybe some of the military, in their own communities, with the Guard and the Reserve, and that ain't always the best.

[Tilly's note - the implication here, is that communities assess the active military by what they see, know, and judge from the Guard and Reserve forces, which they are often more likely to be exposed to than to active duty forces. There are advantages and disadvantages here].

Tilly: Do you think, that since the Draft is no longer in effect, it's not typical for every American young male, to have at least two years experience in the military . . . do you think that could also have an effect on society's perception? That relationship?

Mr. Fogel: Yeah, you know, I think it does. And I know it's better for the military, at least, I believe it is. I

think that, although people complained about going to serve, and we're talking, like my high school and college classes - there was no war. Although everybody complained about having to go in for a couple of years. They came out, and there isn't one of my classmates now, or one of the people who went through that time, who doesn't have war stories to tell, who wouldn't say, "Boy, I learned a lot," or, "I wouldn't do it again for a million dollars, or I wouldn't take a million dollars for having done it." That ol' saying. I think, yes, I think we're losing a lot by not requiring people to serve their country, somehow.

Tilly: If you think within that context, of that national relationship, what kinda' role do you see the media having played in developing that relationship, in defining those roles, and defining the military's mission? How do you see, at the national level, how the media fits into that?

Mr. Fogel: You mean the mission of the military today, as we perceive it?

Tilly: Yes, sir. But not only just the mission, but how is the typical young soldier perceived out there on the streets, by Joe America, through what is presented by radio, TV, print media? How do you think that media has affected . . . ?

Mr. Fogel: Well, I think by it's lack of really doing anything. It has not helped the military create a picture that it wants to present. Except for the commercials that one sees. I don't the media does an awful lot to help the military. I don't think it necessarily relies on negative stories, but that it doesn't go to positive. Let me go back for a moment.

Years ago there used to be a section in newspapers, once a week perhaps, they would run a section, of who is in the service, who got promoted. Mother and Dad could see that, the hometown news service put it in. People had an awareness of what was happening to Johnny Jones from down the street, or even if they didn't know any of these people, they still looked to see who was getting promoted, who did what. You don't have that anymore. There is nothing that

says to this community, and this is the worse, we've got Leavenworth down the street. There is nothing that says to most communities, that we still have young men and women serving in the military. We really oughta', we oughta' make sure we . . .

Tilly: Recognize them.

Mr. Fogel: Yeah, for sure.

Tilly: Why do you think that is, sir? Is it the size of the force? (I then related what Mr. McLanahan had mentioned a few days prior about something having a "hook" as a news piece. How the military does a lot of routine stuff well, but is it always a real news item?) And how that news piece has a lot to do, with it's appeal for an audience, depending on what level you are focusing?

Mr. Fogel: Yeah, but I would tell you, Phil, and I would look at the front page of the Kansas City Star, or the front page of the Metropolitan section of the paper, either front page, and if you want to tell me that there's not more useless information than a story about what an Army down the street has been doing? (We both laugh).

Tilly: Sir, I share with you your views there (we both continue to chuckle).

Mr. Fogel: I agree with, Tom's (McClanahan) got a point. There's no real news story. The last story, I think had a news point, was the four Rangers, unfortunate four Rangers who got killed. But, you know, but great, so why do we look for a news story about some lady in Illinois and some guy in Tennessee who over gambled? That's a nice hook, but it doesn't make sense.

Tilly: I agree with you, sir. But I think that we may not be speaking for the majority of the people out there, who pick up the paper. I'm not sure if the demographic sketch of the audience who picks up the Kansas City Star would reflect our kind of thoughts . . .

Mr. Fogel: No.

Tilly: . . . or somewhat different.

Mr. Fogel: No, they probably would say, "who cares." The Army, the, Rudyard Kipling, "it's somebody this, and somebody that, but when you need 'im, he's always there." I can't remember the. Nobody gives a damn about the Army 'till you need them.

Tilly: And there they're all expected to go out and do it all perfect. No mistakes, and everything is gonna' look great.

Mr. Fogel: Exactly.

Tilly: Can you describe for me, sir, if you would, what it is you do and what it is your position requires of you?

Mr. Fogel: Well, uh, I do two things. I do a morning radio program on a CNN affiliate from 6-9 every morning on which I give my opinion. It doesn't have to be based on information or knowledge (laughter) about mostly things issue oriented, political, whatever. Then I come here to Martin-Fromm and Associates, Inc. which is a fifty year old, nearly fifty year old, association management firm which I own and run. We manage trade associations and professional societies in various fields from the automotive after market, to insurance whole-selling, to one professional society - Association for Psychological Type (?). We do everything that a volunteer leader is credited for, in other words, we do the membership recruiting, bill the dues, invest the money, put on the conventions, publish the newsletters, trade shows, education programs, and we do it all with about a forty person staff.

Tilly: Very interesting. Sir, given your position within the radio medium, and having worked in a number of media avenues, do you think it is important are able to distinguish between these three levels of warfare?

Mr. Fogel: Not necessarily. I think what is important, because what most people would be reporting on a combat situation. Let me change that, because most people who would be reporting about the military, have never served in

the military. We have to assume that most of them are college graduates, between twenty-five and thirty-five. Most of them, if not all of them, have never served in the military, and have no concept of those three areas (strategic, operational, and tactical), but they also have no concept of how an Army is organized. It seems to me that a little briefing book, just a little book that says this is what the Army is, about how an Army is organized, it shows how a platoon, how each platoon into a company, and "X" platoons in a company, and "X" companies in a battalion, and etcetera.

Tilly: How have you seen, in your experience, that a reporter is prepared to go out and cover a military story? A transition book, smart book, some kind of mentor, or is it more, like, here is a list of names and numbers, see this guy here and tell him what you're looking for?

Mr. Fogel: Yeah, it's more the later. When I was a PIO back east, it wasn't all that many years after World War II, so the reporters, probably most of 'em, the guys assigned to cover the NG, and since it was a Division Artillery Headquarters in the state, and it happened to be a very good one, and a very popular commanding general, they had guys who really knew what they were talking about, they had guys who would do right by us. When Special Forces was formed, and E Company in New York state, it was a very glamorous period, a glamorous unit, and guys paid attention to that. And guys knew what they were talking about, to an extent, as much as any of us did, in those days, about what the missions were. So those days, those days are gone. The guys from those days are in their seventies.

And you know, I'm getting this mostly, Phil, from listening to the press conferences that Norm Schwartzkopf inducted, and the idiotic comments, the questions that were asked.

Tilly: Yes, sir.

Mr. Fogel: I think, they were, number one, innocent. Yes, they were stupid, but that's because the innocence wasn't based on any kind of education. I mean, they just really didn't know that Hussein would be watching CNN. . .

Tilly: Hearing those kinds of comments. . .

Mr. Fogel: And putting lives at stake.

Tilly: Sir, do you think reporters would benefit from some kind of formal, or informal, and I'm hesitant to use the word "education" after having discussed this with folks in the media who said that taking away a reporter for a few hours or a day, losing that time, that productivity to attend a class. . . Do you think it would be productive to have reporters take part in some kind of a dialogue, a round-robin table. Do lunch, go over about sixty minutes of stuff that would orient them. So that if they did have to go some place and interview someone like General Schwartzkopf, who was a theater commander, to be able to talk in his language and be able to understand the process he works through. Do you think that kind of thing would be productive for a reporter?

Mr. Fogel: I think would be a very good idea that would probably never happen. Because I don't think you would ever get people to sit around the table in the room. You know, when General Sullivan, I think it was last year, to speak to a AUSA meeting. I think it was at the Hyatt. Now the Hyatt is not far from anyone of the television stations in Kansas City. And we got not one reporter. This is the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, who'd never been here before. I mean he'd been to Leavenworth, but he'd never been to Kansas City in a public meeting. The room was packed. Not one. I guess, the newspaper did cover it. Now that, Jim Gleisburg (Fort Leavenworth PAO), we were talking yesterday on an AUSA project, and it was very frustrating. I don't think, and I think he said it too, and we were talking about having a breakfast for them all. And, I don't think it'll work. I think, however, and I see now, you have it down here already (on the question sheet I provided him), if you send some sort of a pamphlet, doesn't have to fancy. And tells them, what they have to know, in very basic language. And keeps it to the very basic information, and that's the best you're going to get.

Tilly: Do you think the bulk of the reporters are more interested in the tactical level, than the operational or



strategic level? Do you think the appeal is more to the audience at that level?

Mr. Fogel: Yeah, yeah, I do because Johnny and Jimmy, then, are more directly connected to that. However, the Persian Gulf War, was a little bit different, because Schwartzkopf was such an over whelming personality. The strategic area, comes into, with guys like me who mouth off on radio, pretend we know what we're talking about. I think talk radio deals with that much more successfully. That's because you don't have to know too much about what you're talking about, just the political implications.

Tilly: US News and World Report did a book looking at the Gulf War with a lot of interesting details about the war. In this book, you get some good feedback from the reporters. Some of it looked at a few of the "dumb" questions asked by reporters. Building from that, I am looking at how to bring reporters up to a certain level of familiarity, of being acquainted with operational considerations and planning processes, so that they can be more precise in how they approach a story, and can be more informative to their audiences. (We then had a quick discussion on operational security matters, balancing those concerns with getting the story out). My intent being, probably directed to the national-level media people, to bring them up to par on some of these issues. Sir, if you were going to set up that kind of education program, who would you have attending that, who would be the kind of people who could most benefit from that sort of information?

Mr. Fogel: All the networks, and pool reporters, the wire service reporters who would be at the "scene of the crime." And I think that pamphlet idea would still be good. But I think it takes, it takes the military, especially the Army, saying that, there is a question about security. Because CNN is so widely watched everywhere in the world. We certainly can't censure what you're doing, and we intend to answer every question that we can, but we want you to understand the implications of some of the material you're doing. And then, I think you have to lay out for them, without the battle plan, what information they can't get, because the enemy can watch it in real time.

Tilly: They need to hear that from the military side so they can understand what it is that is motivating us to have a PAO sitting with them, or some of the rules we run by.

Mr. Fogel: I just don't think they had any kind of an idea that the enemy was watching them. I don't think most of them are unpatriotic, but you'll always have somebody who wants their story and that's what they're here for, and by golly that's what they're going to do . . . get rid of 'em. I mean it, get rid of them. Somebody has to tell them to go home.

Tilly: Our public affairs doctrine addresses a lot of those considerations. One thing I have run across has to do with General Patton having slapped two soldiers in Sicily. Most folks think it was only one, but it was two. The story made it's way up through the chain, but it also got to Eisenhower through a few, select reporters. Eisenhower told the reporters that he would handle it, but he asked their cooperation in not releasing the story so that Patton could continue to contribute to the war effort in Europe. He assured them the wrong would be righted, but he asked them not to release the story. They respected his request and did not release the story, not immediately, any ways.

Mr. Fogel: But those days, I think, are gone.

Tilly: Sir, I think they are in some circles, and you are much more in tune with what the media is doing these days than I am, but after having met with some super people, here in Kansas City, Mr. McClanahan in the Star, some great folks in television, they looked me in the eye and said, more than anything in the world, we don't want to do violate anything in security that would harm a soldier.

Mr. Fogel: Yeah, but you're talking to Kansas City. And I think that's a wonderful example of the mid-western mentality. Where ever people are from, they are here now. I wish New York, and Los Angeles, more importantly, I wish Washington, those guys really want to get ahead. I'm not saying they're unpatriotic, they're not unpatriotic, but they are there for the story. They want the story with a capital "S." And I am not sure they would look at anyone of

the generals you mentioned earlier, and, think that here is a guy I have to respect and hold his confidence, because, what are we talking about, we're talking about a guy slapping a soldier. Look what happened in Vietnam. The media, lost that war. They won their part of that war. I hate to be so cynical and negative, but, it's very frustrating, and I just don't think the media cares that much, and I'm talking, mostly television.

Tilly: Are you talking, more outside the local kind of focus?

Mr. Fogel: Totally outside the local, New York, Washington, Los Angeles, yeah, the national folks.

Tilly: I would concur with you on that point. I asked myself, if Wolf Blitzer would afford that same kind of respect.

Mr. Fogel: I'll tell you, I think he would. Just knowing him the couple of times I've met him, I think he would be one guy who wouldn't be looking for the capital "S" story. He's not going to be around forever. And I may even be wrong about him, and I hope I'm not. It's just, that I don't think that they care enough. It's not giving away something like when the troops will cross the line of departure. But it's doing enough to say, well the general is asking a favor, hey, I'm a reporter, I have a story.

Tilly: So, at that level, it's more the story, the scoop, for their agenda.

Mr. Fogel: Except . . . if you get to their bosses. Maybe that's the solution. Maybe you have to say to the network heads, who are going to send people over there to cover a situation, and maybe you have to brief them, and ask them for their support. And those guys will pass the word down to the troops, their troops. And then those guys will not say anything, he won't do anything negative. I don't think, they get paid too much money.

Tilly: I never thought about that, from the management side on down, in other words, "this is our management policy in

approaching this topic . . . "

Mr. Fogel: Yeah, maybe, maybe that's one way to do it.

Tilly: You've thrown out a few points about this topic that I've never considered, part of your experience, I guess. If I can ask you about the last question I have. What kind of benefits do you think the media would gain from such an effort, in trying to educate them at the operational level?

Mr. Fogel: Well, they would be able to ask more knowledgeable questions. And hopefully write and report in a more knowledgeable manner. And maybe, and this just occurred to me, maybe there should be some kind of interrelationship between the ROTC departments at various schools and the journalistic or communications departments at the schools. And if that doesn't exist, maybe that could be one way that it could get them right when they start.

I also don't think a press day would work. I do think that one on one, or one at a time. Because that way each one thinks that he or she is the most important. Talking about ego. Let's face it, none of us are in this business to hide. If I'm in a room, with four other people. I know that three of those other stations might out-rate me, or I may out-rate them, either way, either my ego's diminished, or it's bigger. (Mr. Fogel then described a future AUSA event, and how they are trying to approach the media about it).

Media doesn't work well together. It's not that we're loners, but I want the story that you can't get. I mean, we're there to sell soap, and it's who can sell the most soap.

## APPENDIX G:

### SUDDHOF INTERVIEW

Notes from 6 April, 1995, interview with Mr. Doug Suddhof, Advanced Broadcasting Journalism instructor at the University of Kansas, Lawrence.

Mr. Suddhof and I conducted our interview outside at a local eatery called the "Yellow Submarine," right off campus. During our interview a construction team came outside to work on the picnic area of the restaurant, where we were conducting our discussion. Because of the electrical tool noises, cars driving by, and other outdoor sounds, the taped recording of the interview was unsuccessful. There were two major points from our talk that stand out. They are presented in paraphrased form below.

Mr. Suddhof: Before I would ever want to send my son or daughter off to war, I would want someone, the President I guess, to explain to me what is was we were going to be fighting for and why we were committing forces. I am not sure why we sent forces to the Persian Gulf. I am not sure that President Bush did a good job in explaining what national interests were at risk before he deployed our forces.

Tilly: I expressed the view that I thought President Bush had done an excellent job in presenting that point to the American people and that had been evidenced by the strong support we received from the public at large. I further pointed out how Saddam Hussein had the potential to continue his attack into the Saudi oil refineries and how much that could have jeopardized our economy and the world's.

Mr. Suddhof: (On the point of including some kind of instruction about the military in the school's

journalism/broadcasting curriculum:) I don't think we could actually find room within our class loads to do that. We are stretched to the limit as it is. I think it might be more beneficial to set up some kind of seminar session, maybe on a regional basis, for reporters and correspondents. Once the fighting broke out, or once we had clear indications that it was about to, the Government could sponsor these seminars to educate the media about all these things we have discussed. I just don't think there is time in the curriculum to include military familiarization instruction.

[These notes are from memory and not written or sound recordings. They are not precise and are not meant to be interpreted as such. They do represent, as best as I can recall, two of the main points that Mr. Suddhof impressed upon me.]

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